

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

GO WORLD

AUTUMN 1981

NO.25





Play starts in the first game of the 6th Meijin title match. Cho won this game and has already taken a three-game lead.

CONTENTS

Go World News	2
Cho Chikun Wins Double Crown	2
Cho Meijin Leads Kato 3—0	2
Otake Defends Gosei Title	2
6th Kisei Tournament	3
Tournament Roundup	4
1981 U.S. Championships	5
1981 Australian Championships	5
Current Title-holders	5
3rd World Amateur Championship: Semifinal — Shao v. Park	6
Semifinal — Murakami v. Ma	8
Final — Shao v. Ma	11
Special Game Commentary: Takemiya Masaki v. Miyamoto Naoki	16
19th Judan Title: Game One	26
Game Two	29
Game Three	33
Michael Redmond's Professional Debut	38
Redmond v. Komatsu	38
Redmond v. Yoshida	42
Redmond v. Shiratori	44
36th Honinbo Title Match: Game One	48
Game Two	50
Game Three	52
Game Four	54
Book Review: Five-In-A-Row (Renju)	59
Page from Go History: Genjo and Chitoku	60

The cover: Fukurokuju, Daikoku and Ebisu, the gods of long life, riches and food, gathered around a go board. From a woodblock print in the Shijo style by Toichi, mid-19th century. Collection of William Pinckard.

Go World is published by The Ishi Press.
Address subscriptions to: The Ishi Press, Inc.
CPO BOX 2126, Tokyo, Japan
Editor: John Power

Yearly subscription rate: ¥4,000 (4 issues by seaimail)
Price per single issue: ¥1,000
Airmail rate: ¥6,000 per year. ¥1,500 per single issue
(Discounts are available for bulk orders)

From this issue Go World is published as a quarterly. From issue No. 1 (May/June, 1977) to issue No. 24 (March/April, 1981) it appeared as a bimonthly. All back issues up through No. 24 are still available at the following rates. one issue: ¥835

one issue: ¥835

sets of six issues: ¥720 per issue, or ¥4,320 per set of six

complete set of the first 24 issues: ¥15,000

Note: Japanese, Chinese and Korean names are given with the family name first.

© Copyright 1981 in Japan by The Ishi Press, Inc.

All rights reserved according to international law. This magazine or any part thereof may not be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher.



Cho Chikun, Meijin & Honinbo

Cho Chikun Wins Double Crown

Cho Chikun has become the fourth player in tournament history to win the double crown of Meijin and Honinbo. Cho Meijin earned this honour by defeating Takemiya 4–2 in the 36th Honinbo title match. At twenty-four, Cho is the youngest player to achieve this feat (Sakata was forty-three and Ishida and Rin were both twenty-six). Cho is enjoying glorious form this year (his record as of the 9th October is 30–6) and he has replaced Kato Masao as the dominant figure in tournament play. Can the first triple crown be far away?

The results of the Honinbo title match:

Game 1 (May 26, 27). Cho (W) won by resig.
Game 2 (June 3, 4). Cho (B) won by resig.
Game 3 (June 16, 17). Cho (W) won by 3½ points.
Game 4 (June 23, 24). Takemiya (W) won by resig.
Game 5 (July 7, 8). Takemiya (B) won by resig.
Game 6 (July 15, 16). Cho (B) won by 3½ points.

Cho Meijin Leads Kato 3–0

Cho Meijin has started off the 6th Meijin title match in the same way as the Honinbo match by sweeping to a commanding 3–0 lead over the challenger, Kato Masao. This gives Cho an iron grip on his title, though Kato may yet emulate Takemiya in making a comeback. The series started with one of the most bloodthirsty games



The challenger, Kato, has his back to the wall in the Meijin title match.

in recent tournament go, with a total of 81 stones being captured. Sakata, who is fond of fighting himself, commented that this is what championship go should be. We will present this game in our next issue.

Results to date:

Game 1 (Sept. 9, 10). Cho (W) won by 1½ points.
Game 2 (Sept. 24, 25). Cho (B) won by 3½ points.
Game 3 (Oct. 1, 2). Cho (W) won by 3½ points.

The Meijin league ended in a tie for first place between Otake and Kato, both with 7–1 scores. Kato defeated Otake in a playoff, held on the 20th August. Rin, Takemiya, Kobayashi and Sakata also retained their places in the league.

Otake Defends Gosei Title

Otake may feel a little lonely without his accustomed Meijin title, but he is managing to hang on to his other two titles. In the 6th Gosei title match he had no trouble dealing with the challenge of a somewhat out-of-form Kato. Although the latter still holds the Tengen and Oza titles, he is in a definite slump compared to his brilliant form of two or three years ago, and he was only able to take one game from Otake in the Gosei title match. However, he did get his revenge in the Meijin league playoff. The results:

Game 1 (July 8). Otake (W) won by 6½ points.



Otake defends his Gosei title, rebuffing the challenger, Kato Masao, 3-1. Watching the analysis of the 4th game are Okubo 9-dan, the referee, and Kobayashi Koichi.

Game 2 (July 16). Otake (B) won by resig.

Game 3 (July 28). Kato (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (August 3). Otake (B) won by 2½ points.

6th Kisei Tournament

The first two stages of this tournament have now been completed, and the third stage, which decides the challenger to Fujisawa Shuko, is about to begin. The results:

Stage One

9-dan: Shiraishi Yutaka (Kansai Ki-in); 2nd: Rin

Kaiho; 3rd: Kobayashi Koichi, Tono Hiroaki (K.K.)

8-dan: Ishida Akira; 2nd: Ishigure Ikuro

7-dan: Hasegawa Sunao (K.K.); 2nd: Awaji Shuzo

6-dan: Yamashiro Hiroshi

5-dan: Kataoka Satoshi

4-dan: Ko Mosei

3-dan: O Meien

2-dan: Seki Kazuya

1-dan: Yoda Norimoto

This year the Kansai Ki-in did a little better than usual, winning two dan championships and get-

6th Meijin League

Rank	Name	O	K	T	R	K	S	Sh	Y	S	Score
1	Otake	—	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	7-1
2	Kato	0	—	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7-1
3	Takemiya	0	0	—	0	1	1	1	1	0	4-4
4	Rin	0	0	1	—	1	1	1	1	1	6-2
5	Kobayashi	0	0	0	0	—	1	1	1	1	4-4
6	Sakata	1	0	0	0	0	—	1	0	1	3-5
7	Shimamura	0	0	0	0	0	0	—	1	0	1-7
7	Yamabe	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	—	0	1-7
7	Sato	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	—	3-5

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

ting three players into the second stage.

Second Stage

Seki beat Yoda, but lost to O Meien, who beat Ko, then lost to Awaji.

Quarter-finals) Awaji beat Rin, Kobayashi beat Ishida, Hasegawa beat Tono, Ishigure beat Shiraishi.

Semifinals) Kobayashi beat Awaji, Ishigure beat Hasegawa.

Final) Kobayashi beat Ishigure.

Third Stage

Pairings for the first round are as follows:

Kobayashi v. Ishigure, Takemiya v. Kato, Otake v. Awaji, Rin v. Shiraishi. Cho Chikun and Hasegawa both have byes. The betting is that Cho Chikun will be the challenger. He came top in a poll of Yomiuri readers forecasting the challenger, but that means he has to break a jinx, for the player coming top in this poll has never become the challenger.

Tournament Roundup

O Rissei Wins Shinjin-O

O Rissei (Wang Li-ch'eng), the twenty-two year old Taiwanese player, defeated Hasegawa Sunao, age twenty-one, of the Kansai Ki-in, in the playoff of the 6th Shinjin-O (King of the New Stars) title. O took the title with two straight wins. This is his first title.

Awaji Wins P. M. 's Cup

Awaji Shuzo 8-dan won the 25th P.M.'s Cup, defeating Kataoka Satoshi 2-0 in the playoff.

Awaji previously won this title in 1977.

Hashimoto Shoji to Challenge Kato Oza

Hashimoto Shoji of the Kansai Ki-in earned the right to challenge Kato Masao for the Oza title by defeating Takemiya Masaki in a playoff held on the 24th September. This will be Hashimoto's second title match this year and he must be hoping to do better than he did against Otake in the Judan title match (he lost 0-3). Hashimoto has also reached the final of the Tengen tournament, but his opponent there has yet to be decided.

Nieh Wins Chinese Championship

Nieh Wei-p'ing, the perennial Chinese champion, has won the 1st All-China Championship (the championship was hitherto known as the All-China Wei-ch'i Competition), which was held from the 1st to the 17th August at the Peking Ki-in. The championship consisted of a preliminary tournament with thirty-two players, eight of whom won their way into the final league. Nieh took 1st place with a 6-1 score, losing only to the current World Amateur Champion, Shao, who took 3rd place with a 4-3 score. Second was Huang, with a 5-2 score. Nieh's wife, Kuang Shang-ming, took 6th place with a 3-4 score. The 1st and 2nd place-getters automatically gain places in next year's league. If one player takes 1st place three years in a row, he will not play in the league either, instead meeting the winner of the league in a playoff.



Kato gets his revenge on Otake in the Meijin league playoff.

1981 U.S. Championships

The U.S. Championships were very successful this year, with 102 players in the East and 61 in the West. There were nine sponsors and \$2,500 worth of prizes. The Hanguk Kiwon sent two professional players, so there was one at each tournament. The BBC, which is doing a documentary on games, sent a TV crew to the Easterns, while in the West two newspapers and two TV stations provided coverage.

The Eastern winner was a surprise. Ron Snyder beat Matsuda, J.M. Lee (last year's winner), and S.Y. Cho (another top Korean player) and finished 5-1 in a tie with Mr. Gun Han, another Korean and new to the AGA tournament scene. Han lost in Round 1 to Dr. Zeng (a recent arrival from mainland China) and lost the tournament on SOS. The Eastern Contender Tournament — the semifinals for the WAC team — was won by Bruce Wilcox with a tight last round win over Young Kwon by 6½ points.

In the West, Kyung Kim, 1980 Champion, lost in the first round to a 6-dan Korean from the Bay area, but stormed back during the next five rounds to finish 5-1. Charlie Huh 6-dan of Seattle also finished 5-1 and, despite losing to Kim in the final round, won the tournament on SOS. The Western contender for the WAC is Sidney Kobashigawa from Mt. View.

As a footnote, the 163 players in the combined U.S. Championships could well make them the largest national championship outside the Orient. Next year 200 is not too much to expect.

(Condensed from a report by Terry Benson)

1981 Australian Championships

Division A was won by Dae Hahn 6-dan with a 5-0 score, with Masuda 6-dan and Park 5-dan tying for second. Division B was won by John Chen 3-dan. The WAC representative is Neville Smythe 1-dan, who beat Clive Davies 2-dan in a playoff.

Late News. 6th Meijin Title

Cho Chikun defended his Meijin title by winning the fourth game, played on the 14th and 15th October, by 1½ points. The Cho dynasty enters its second year.

6th Kisei Title


Kobayashi, Takemiya, Awaji and Rin won their 1st round games in the third stage (see pairings on p. 4). Second round pairings are: Kobayashi v. Cho (winner to play Takemiya), Rin v. Hasegawa (winner to play Awaji).

Current Title-holders

Kisei: Fujisawa Shuko 9-dan
Meijin, Honinbo: Cho Chikun 9-dan
Judan: Otake Hideo 9-dan
Tengen, Oza: Kato Masao 9-dan
Gosei: Otake Hideo 9-dan
P.M.'s Cup: Awaji Shuzo 8-dan
Shinjin-O: O Rissei 6-dan
Women's Ch'ship (Honinbo): Honda Sachiko 6-dan
NHK Cup: Fujisawa Shuko 9-dan
Haya-go Championship: Sakata Eio 9-dan
Kakusei: Otake Hideo 9-dan
Asia Airlines Cup: Otake Hideo 9-dan
New Stars Tournament: Ishida Akira 8-dan
Women's Kakusei: Kobayashi Reiko 6-dan
Amateur Honinbo: Murakami Bunsho
Amateur Best Ten: Kikuchi Yasuro
Nihon Ki-in Amateur Champion: Hirata Hiro-nori

Correction to GW24

We apologise for the unreconstructed diagram on page 36 in GW24. The lettering should have been as given below.



Advertisement

Game Commentaries by Professionals

Now available for go fans, a new service — send a copy of one of your games (up to 150 moves) for a detailed commentary, with explanatory diagrams, by Nihon Ki-in professionals.

Fee. Medium-length commentary (about 4 diagrams attached): \$20

Detailed commentary (7 or more diagrams): \$30

Send a bank cheque payable to Y. Ozawa or cash.

Note new address:

Yoshiaki Ozawa
2-8-9-205 Shinsayama
Sayama-shi 350-13
Japan

3rd World Amateur Championship

We join this tournament in the semifinal round, which matched Shao (China) against Park (Korea) and Ma (China) against Murakami (Japan). The commentaries are from the book *The 3rd World Amateur Go Championship* published by the Nihon Ki-in.

Game 1

White: Shao Zhen-zhong

Black: Park Sang-don

komi: 5½; March 13, 1981





Figure 1 (1 – 36)

Figure 1 (1 – 36)

White 12 and 14 were played in the wrong order.

Dia. 1. White should play the hane at 1 first. If Black connects at 2, White descends at 3, and the joseki ends with Black 4. Later, Black 'a' can be answered by White 'b', so White 'c' remains a valid threat.



Dia. 1

After Black 17 in the figure, Black 'a' must be answered by White 'b', so Black is considerably thicker on the outside than in Dia. 1, and has the advantage.

White 18 was a good point, but White 'c', to counter Black's thickness to the right, might have been better.

Black 19 was therefore doubtful. Black should have used his thickness by approaching the

bottom left corner at c'. If White answered at 'd', Black 'e' would make a deep framework.

As a result of Black's choice of 19, he was led to approach the bottom left corner from the wrong side at 31, provoking White 32. Blocking at 'f' is not so large now, because White 'g' becomes sente in response. If Black fails to play 'f', however, a white extension to 'h' nullifies the thickness to the right.

White 36 at 'i' would be the usual move. White's peeping at 36 caused unexpected developments in the next figure.




Figure 2 (37 – 66)


Figure 2 (37 – 66)

If Black had played 45 at 47, he could have gotten Dia. 2.

Dia. 2. White captures at 6, but does not capture the stone to the right of 5, and Black's side is larger.

White's hane at 50, attacking Black's center group, seemed to put White ahead, but Black's replies turned out sur-

prisingly well, and after the extensions at 59 and 61, the lead lay with Black and his center thickness rather than with White.



Dia. 2

8: connects





Figure 3 (67 – 100)
82: ko

Figure 3 (67 – 100)

Black 67 was over-cautious.

Dia. 3. Black should have connected at 1. He was probably afraid of a white attachment at 2, but as the sequence from 3 to 15 shows, his group was in no danger of dying.



Dia. 3


The ko-style reinforcement at 76 and 78 was a good combination, with a perfect ko threat at 80. The cut at 80 put White back into contention.

Black lost potential by exchanging 87 for 88. He should just have played 89.

Black 91 was slack. White's checking extension to 94 threw Black's lead into doubt.

Black 95 was another slack move. Black seemed to be viewing the game optimistically, but after White defended with 96 to 100, this optimism was not justified.

Dia. 4. Black should have played 1 to break into White's bottom territory. If White cuts at 4, Black resists with 5 and 7. After the hane at 13, the situation is fluid. Note that Black must not



Dia. 4

give atari with 7 at 'a', or White will cross under at 'b'.





Figure 4 (101 – 142)
16: ko 38: connects

Figure 4 (101 – 142)

In reply to White's ko threat at 14, Black should not have ventured out at 15. After losing most of his corner territory in the sequence from White 18 to 34, Black seemed to have no more chance.

Dia. 5. Although Black may not have liked being shut in by White 2, he still should have played Black 1. With Black 3 or 'a' to play next, he would not have been badly off.

White 42 was a good move. If it were omitted, Black could blockade White at the same point. The bad effect of the triangled exchange is now apparent.



Dia. 5

Game 2

White: Murakami Bunsho

Black: Ma Xiao-chung

komi: 5½

March 13, 1981




Figure 5 (143 - 200)

55: recaptures. 65: recaptures.

Figure 5 (143 - 200)

Black recovered from his mishap in the last figure by cutting at 43 and capturing two stones in the tortoise-shell shape with 49. That evened the game up.

In the decisive endgame fighting from there on, however, White gradually pulled ahead. Black's biggest mistake was 85. If he had played 85 at 'a' and linked up on the right side, the finish would have been closer.




Figure 6 (201 - 294)

ko: 17, 20, 23, 26, 29. 33 at 1. 55 at 21. ko at 62: 65, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82, 85. 86 at 3. 87 connects at 32. 88 takes ko. Black connects at 34; White connects above 60.

White wins by 4½ points.





Figure 1 (1 - 38)


Figure 1 (1 - 38)

White's diagonal connection at 12 is unusual, and open to question. It seems heavy.

Dia. 1. White did not play 1 and 3 because he did not want to get cut by Black 4. The sequence through 12 gives Black impressive outside thickness. The joseki in which White pushes through and cuts with 3 at 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' is not playable because of the triangled stone. However, there is another choice for 3, which White should have taken.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. White should have played 1 and 3. After Black 4, White 5 gives a fair result.

White 20 asked for trouble. White should have played the knight's move at 'a' on the right side. If Black then played 20, White could extend to 'b', a reasonable exchange.

Black 21 helped White by giving him the cut at 22.


Dia. 3. Black should have extended straight out with 1 and 3. Threatened with Black 'a', White would be on the verge of collapse.



Dia. 3

White 24 was a good cut, and Black could not help answering at 25.


Dia. 4. If Black gives atari at 1, White responds with 2 and 4.




Dia. 4

White 26, however, was a mistake.

Dia. 5. White should have moved diagonally at 1. If Black answered at 2, White would trap him short of liberties with 3 and 5.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. If Black captures the white stone with 2, White connects at 3. Next Black sacrifices the corner and builds outside influence with 4 and 6.

Black 29 led to a fair trade for both sides, but —

Dia. 7. If Black had captured two stones with 1 and 3, he would have had the advantage.




Dia. 7

6: connects


Black 37 prepared for a capturing race in the corner, but White 38 was a mistake that cost White a move.

Dia. 8. White should have played 1. After White 9, the capturing race is highly favorable to him.

Dia. 9. Black 1 to White 8 is the correct continuation, but the best Black can get is a three-step ko (Black 'a', White 'b').



Dia. 8



Dia. 9




Figure 2 (39 - 73)
59 at 53

Figure 2 (39 - 73)


White 40 was another mistake. The exchange for Black 41 cost White a liberty.

Black 47 and 53 helped White out. If Black had filled liberties as shown in Dias. 8 and 9 the ko would have been direct.

White 62 to 70 gave White the edge in the capturing race, but at a very high price.

Dia. 10. After 71, if Black starts filling liberties with 1, he has to play an extra move at 3. After 9, the capturing race is favorable to White.

White was therefore able to take sente and shift to 72, but then Black made a severe contact play on the lower side at 73.



Dia. 10

Figure 3 (74 - 111)

5 connects (below 1)

After being squeezed on both the right and lower sides through 84, White could claim little profit from his capture of the corner.

White 96 misinterprets the situation. Creating a double ko on the lower side does not affect the capturing race on the right side.

Black reduced the top with 105-109, then capped at 111, methodically building up his attack.




Figure 3 (74 - 111)
95: ko





Figure 4 (112 - 148)

Figure 4 (112 - 148)

Black gave up profit by answering White's cut at 14 with 19 and 21 and allowing White 26 and 28, but he had good prospects of making it up by using his thickness to attack the group below.

Black 35 was a mistake and let White live with 36 to 46.

Dia. 11. Black could definitely have killed the group if he had played 1 to 5.



Dia. 11

White 48 let slip the last opportunity. If White had played this stone at 'a', the game might still have been up for grabs.

Figure 5 (149 – 200), Figure 6 (201 – 263)

Giving Black a clean squeeze with 49 to 55 settled the outcome. By dint of a horrendous ko threat at 86 White finally managed to capture the bottom right corner with 90, but this meant letting Black capture 62 with 89 and 91.

From 92 onward White was just playing to see what would happen. The game was essentially decided by the opening fight in the bottom right corner.

White resigns at Black 263.




Figure 5 (149 – 200)

ko: 67, 70, 73. 74 connects beside 68.

ko: 76, 79, 82, 85, 88.




Figure 6 (201 – 263)

Final Round

So the championship came down to a deciding game between two players from the country in which go began. The commentary by Takemiya is from the May issue of *Kido*.

White: Shao Zheng-zhong

Black: Ma Xiao-chung

komi: 5½

14 March, 1981




Figure 1 (1 – 41)

Figure 1 (1 – 41)

The opening moves through White 14 are frequently seen in professional play.

White 18. Another good choice would be White 'a'.

Black 21 should have been on the third line at 'b'. Since the white positions on both the right and left sides are strong, Black cannot expect anything in the center; there is no reason for him to play high.

Black 23 is usually played at 26. By choosing the contact play at 23, Black forced a settlement of the shape. The continuation from 24 to 36 was probably forced, and the result was a fair exchange.

Black 37 was thick, promising a forcing move at 'c' later.

White 38 was calm. The cut at 'd' could also be considered, but perhaps that would be an overplay.

White 40. If at 'e', Black 40, White 'f', Black 'g', White 'h', and Black 'i' follow, giving a ko. Black has a perfect ko threat at 'c'.




Figure 2 (42 - 83)
60 connects

Figure 2 (42 - 83)

White 42 at 43, followed by Black 'a', White 42, Black 58, White 45, could also be considered.


Black 43 is usually played at 45 to force White 'b', which then induces Black 43, but Black's reversal of the order of 43 and 45 was a brilliant idea. After White 46, Black now has the choice of giving atari at either 57 or 'c'.

Black 49 does not attack very effectively, but there seems to be no better alternative.

White 54. It is a shame that White did not try the cut at 1 in Dia. 1.

Dia. 1. If Black replies with 2 to 6, White can play 7 and Black is in trouble.

Black must have felt relieved when he was allowed to defend at 55.



Dia. 1

Black 71. The proper move is to connect at 72.

White 76 aims at moves on the upper side, but the 76-77 exchange is to Black's advantage.

White 82 makes a strange shape, but is a bit stronger than the usual move at 'd'.

Black 83 is not sharp enough. Black should have played 'e' to forestall the cut that White made next.




Figure 3 (84 - 112)

Figure 3 (84 - 112)

White 84 was a gratifying cut. Through 88, White's territory swelled considerably.

White 90 was a dangerous forcing move, risking Black 1 in Dia. 2.

Dia. 2. If Black wedges in at 1, presumably White will not answer with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', but break through at 2.

Black 91. Black decides that he is ahead and plays safe.

Black 99 was an amateurish move.


Dia. 3. Black 1 and 3 are a stronger combination.

Black 101. In this shape Black should simply defend at 'a'. When White cuts at 102, Black begins to experience bad aji.


Black 107 at 111 would have been a steadier move.

Before 112, White should have played 1 to 5 in Dia. 4.


Dia. 4. White makes Black connect at 6, then jumps to 7. Later he can descend at 'a' and force Black to capture him.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 5. Note that after giving atari at 1, White must not follow with 3 and 5, despite what this gains on the upper side, because Black 6 captures four vital cutting stones. If White connects at 'a', Black plays 'b'.





Figure 4 (113 - 160)

Figure 4 (113 - 160)

Black 23 was a large move, but guarding the center took priority.

Dia. 6. Black defends at 1. If White plays 2, the diagonal move at 3 seems to give Black a secure lead.

White 24 does not have much effect now, because Black makes an eye with 27 and 29. Compare Dia. 4.



Dia. 6


White 30 was a powerful move. A great deal of aji sprang to life when White escaped here.

White 40 was large.

Black 41 and 43. This combination makes it hard for White to connect at 'a' because the threat of Black 'b' remains. Black 41 at 'c', however, would also have been big.

Black 47 indirectly captures the four white stones to the right of 'a'.

White 58 was a thick move, threatening 'a'.



Dia. 7

Dia. 7. White connects at 1. Black cannot cut at 2 and 4 because of White 5.

Black 59 should have been 'c'. The purpose of 59 was to prevent White 1 in Dia. 7. That is, by providing a stone at 'a' in Dia. 7, Black can refute White 5 with 'b'. However, Black could afford to wait till White actually connected at 1, then answer at 'a'.




Figure 5 (161 - 205)


Figure 5 (161 - 205)

White 64 was nicely timed. If played after White connects at 66, Black will not answer at 65.

White 74 was similarly well timed. Later, Black could answer it by capturing at 79 instead of connecting at 75. If Black played 79 now, however, White would take sente with the hane at 85. Shao is displaying considerable skill in the fine points of the game.

White 88 makes the game very close, but Black is perhaps still slightly ahead.

The hane at 103 put Black on the path to defeat. Either Ma thought he was losing or he wanted to take profit by this ko to settle the issue more quickly, but he was forcing the pace unnecessarily. He should have played Black 1 in Dia. 8.



Dia. 8

Dia. 8. Black 1 saves two stones from capture. If White counters with 2 and 4, Black can descend at 5 in sente against the top left white group. Despite the bottom right corner, Black is not behind.




Figure 6 (206 - 305)

ko: 9, 12, 15, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32. 33 connects at 30. *ko:* 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68. 74 connects at 63.

103 connects at 60. 105 connects at 48.

Figure 6 (206 - 305)

White 16 and 18 were extremely big.

Black 19. The ko has gone too far to stop.

Black 25 and 49 were painful responses to have to make. Black 57, losing a liberty, was also painful, but Black was running short of ko threats, so 57 was unavoidable.

Black 67 may have been Black's last chance. If he had finished the ko with 'a', allowing White 67, then played 75, he might have won by half a point.

White 70. White cannot afford to answer Black 69; he is out of ko threats.

Black 71 captures three stones, but when the neutral points are filled, Black will have to connect inside this territory at Δ . In the end, that caused him to lose by half a point.

White 72 makes profit in sente. If Black ignores it, White plays 'b', Black 73, White 85, and Black cannot cut at 84 because he has filled his own liberty at 57.

White wins by ½ point.

(Translated by James Davies)

A new departure in go publishing

THE KISEIDO PUBLISHING COMPANY

announces the forthcoming publication of

INVINCIBLE

THE GAMES OF SHUSAKU

Compiled, edited and translated by John Power

A definitive collection of the best games of one of the greatest go players in history, with detailed commentaries by top modern professional players and a full description of the historical background.

Shusaku (1829 – 62), ‘the invincible’, was the outstanding player in an age of go geniuses. In the annual castle games (O-shiro-go), participation in which was severely restricted to the top players of the day, thus making it the highest honour open to a go player, Shusaku set an unprecedented record of nineteen straight wins over a period of thirteen years, a feat without parallel in the two hundred and fifty year history of the castle games. He was also victorious in every important match he played and, in what was the golden age of go, he firmly established his preeminence. His tragic death at the age of thirty-three was an enormous blow to the go world.

Shusaku also made great contributions to the development of go theory. His famous ‘Shusaku style’ fuseki pattern laid the foundations of modern fuseki theory and is still popular today. In Japan his games are considered exemplary and are required study for all serious students of go. In fact, the first task invariably assigned to would-be professionals or insei is to go through his complete games. Go Seigen is one example of a famous player who studied Shusaku thoroughly in his formative period.

This book gives a unique and detailed insight into the world of nineteenth century Japanese go. Apart from the castle games mentioned above, highlights include:

Shusaku’s precocious triumph over Gennan Inseki, the arch-enemy of the Honinbo house. Their series produced the most famous move in go history, ‘the ear-reddening move of Shusaku’.

All the games from the famous twenty-three game series in which Shusaku finally defeated his main rival, Ota Yuzo.

Shusaku’s games with his teacher, Shuwa, the 14th Honinbo, which contain some of the most interesting and subtle go of the period.

And many others, amounting to eighty games with detailed commentary (Part One), with an additional selection of sixty-two games (Part Two).

HARD COVER

DELUXE LIMITED EDITION OF 2000 COPIES

Price: ¥10,000

432 pages, ‘Go World’ size

Publication date: November 1981

Payment may be made by personal check in US dollars for the yen equivalent, bank draft, international money order, or cash. Payment may also be made to the following accounts for The Kiseido Publishing Company.

Bank of America

Tokyo Branch

Account number: 15405–015

Reserve your copy now

Order direct from:

The Kiseido Publishing Company

Central Post Office Box 2188

Tokyo, Japan

Post giro

Account number: Tokyo 6–45629

Special Game Commentary

The game below was played between Miyamoto Naoki and Takemiya Masaki in the elimination rounds of the Tengen tournament. Readers who have enjoyed Miyamoto's books may enjoy seeing how he faces up to top-level competition. His commentary takes the form of answers to questions sent in by readers of *Gekkan Gogaku*.

Black: Takemiya Masaki, Honinbo

White: Miyamoto Naoki, 9-dan

komi: 5½;

7th Tengen elimination rounds





Figure 1 (1 - 40)


Figure 1 (1 - 40)

Can't White play 10 at 15?


That is actually the more common move, and Dia. 1 shows the expected result. (White 11 can also be at 'a'.) However, this seemed to be what Black wanted, so I played White 10 and 12 to oppose him.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

White 16 and 18 are unusual. Are they new moves?


I think this may be the first time they have appeared in professional play. Usually White hanes and connects at 1 and 3 in Dia. 2, then Black jumps out to 4 and a fight develops, but I didn't like this pattern because it leaves White vulnerable to Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 3. If White answers at 4, Black forces him down with the atari at 5, which is intolerable, so White has the problem of devising some other reply to Black's attachment at 1. This is one of the reasons I decided to try out White 16 and 18 in the figure. They seem to be a pair of good, workable moves.

Why does Black hane at 19? Can't he just play 21?


He would prefer to do that, because playing Black 19 and abandoning it helps White make eye shape by capturing at 38 later. Let's see what happens if Black just plays 1 in Dia. 4. If White connects at 2, Black plays the double hane at 3 and 5. This is excellent for Black; if White captures with 3, 5, and 7 in Dia. 5, he gets wiped out by Black 6 and 8.




Dia. 4



Dia. 5




Dia. 6




Dia. 7

The trouble is that when Black plays 1, White answers by descending at 2 in Dia. 6. Next, if Black cuts at 3 in Dia. 7, White gives up a stone with 4, or if Black plays 3 at 'a', White answers at 'b'. Either result is bad for Black, so little as he likes it, he has to hane at 19 in the figure. Then White 20, and White 22 in reply to 21, are absolutely necessary and Black can make his double hane at 25 and 27. He plays 23 first, while he can be sure of White's answering at 24.

Instead of White 20, how about the diagonal contact play at 1 in Dia. 8?




Dia. 8




Dia. 9


Black's refutation is to connect at 2. If White descends at 3, Black clamps at 4 in Dia. 9, capturing the two triangled cutting stones. If White goes back to 1 in Dia. 10, Black thrusts in at 2. White has to connect at 3, and Black captures a stone with 6 and 8 in Dia. 11, getting a much better result than in the figure. Due to the triangled stone, White can no longer peep at 'a'.




Dia. 10



Dia. 11




Dia. 12




Dia. 13

Instead of 22, suppose White gives atari at 1 in Dia. 12 and exchanges through 5 in Dia. 13. How is that?

Quite playable for White, because of his large corner profit, but this is not what will happen. Black will willingly connect at 2 in Dia. 14. Next comes White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', and so on — the same bad result as in Dia. 11.



Dia. 14




Dia. 15


In the exchange through White 40, who has the advantage?

Assuming that White later connects at 1 and Black defends at 2 in Dia. 15, White has the better outside position, but he has played one more stone than Black, so the trade is fair. If Black ignores White 1 in Dia. 15, White 1 in Dia. 16 gives a ko, as we shall see in the actual game.


The diagonal tesuji at 1 in Dia. 16 is unusual. In this type of shape, the hane at 1 in Dia. 17 is the usual move. White's aim is to




Dia. 16



Dia. 17




Dia. 18




Dia. 19

connect at 3 in Dia. 18, then kill Black with the attachment at 5, but here that does not work. Black connects at 6 in Dia. 19, then makes the throw-in at 8 in Dia. 20 and White is trapped — he cannot connect at 8.




Dia. 20




Dia. 21


In contrast to this failure, the diagonal move in Dia. 21 works very well. If Black answers at 2, White 3 kills him unconditionally. There is no way for Black to capture either White 1 or 3, and capturing the triangled stone gives only a false eye.




Dia. 22



Dia. 23



Dia. 24




Dia. 25


Answering White 1 with Black 2 in Dia. 22 is just as bad. White's counter is the hane at 3 in Dia. 23. If Black blocks at 4 in Dia. 24, White cuts at 5, and Black is unconditionally dead again.

Black's only choice is to answer White 1 by giving atari at 2 in Dia. 25. White extends to 3, Black has to stop him from linking up at 4, and White 5 gives a ko.

If Black plays 37 at 1 in Dia. 26, can't he keep White 'a' from being sente?




Dia. 26




Dia. 27


Black 1 in Dia. 26 is unappealing because it concedes territory. It would have some justification if it made Black completely safe, but it doesn't; a white stone at 'a' still threatens the corner. Suppose White plays 'a' after 2 and 4 and Black ignores him. White attacks with the atari at 1 in Dia. 27. If Black captures at 2, White's placement at 3 in Dia. 28 leads directly to a ko with 4 and 5. When Black captures White 5 with 'a', White can even afford to connect at 'b'. If Black answers White 1 by descending at 2 in Dia. 29, White attaches at 3. The continuation is Black 4 through 8 in Dia. 30, and it would be good enough for White to connect at 'a', forcing Black to live with just two eyes at 'b', but White can also reduce Black to one eye by playing 9 in Dia. 31. Black captures three stones, White captures two stones, and Black just barely escapes with 12 in Dia. 32.




Dia. 28



Dia. 29




Dia. 30



Dia. 31

As long as this diagram is threatened, the need for Black to maintain an escape route down the left side will considerably interfere with his freedom of play. However you look at it, there is no profit in Black 1 in Dia. 26.



Dia. 32





Figure 2 (41 - 54)

Figure 2 (41 - 54)

Black 41 is big, but aren't there bigger points on the board?

There is an immense difference between Black's playing 41 and White's extending from his wall and approaching the corner at 'a' or 'b'. Closing the top right corner at 'c' or taking the right-side star point at 43 would also be big, but Black 41 builds toward an attack on the white wall.

Would it be meaningless for Black to push out at 1 in Dia. 33 instead of playing 41?




Dia. 33


Black 1 would be quite a good move. One pictures White defending at 2, Black extending to 3, and White approaching the top right corner at 4: that would make a perfectly good game.

Since Black ignored White 42 to take the large point at 43, the top left corner later got into a ko. If Black had used 43 to defend the top left, would he have fallen behind?

Black 43 astonished me. Of course Black should have defended the top left corner with 'd'; apparently he had overlooked the ko and thought White 42 was played purely to defend against Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 34. But if White 42



Dia. 34




Dia. 35

were not sente, instead of the attachment at 34 in Figure 1, White would have made the diagonal move at 1 in Dia. 35, so as not to leave defects in his own shape. Being able to play 42 in sente was a prerequisite for the attachment at 34. This was an extraordinary oversight by Black.

Were White 44 and the ensuing moves correct?

They were questionable. There was no need for this type of maneuver. I should have taken my time and played 1 in Dia. 36 (a key point),



Dia. 36

forcing Black to respond at 2, then just played 3 and 5. There is no harm in letting Black surround territory in the upper right because White can always invade it by starting the ko in the top left and getting two moves in a row. In the actual game, I met with fierce resistance from Black 51 and 53.





Figure 3 (55 - 92)

Figure 3 (55 - 92)

With 55, what if Black blocks at 1 in Dia. 37?

White gets away easily with 2 and 4. Black can then attack with 5 and 7, but White has adequate defensive resources in the contact plays at 'a' and 'b'.


White 56 began the ko, and the moves from Black 57 onward were as shown in Dias. 21 to 25.



Dia. 37

How do you evaluate the exchange through White 64?

White lost out. Through 63, Black took ten points of territory in the top left corner, and his descent at 59 weakened the white group on the outside. On the right, it cannot be said that White made full use of his privilege to two consecutive moves. The shape formed through Black 65 can be analyzed by supposing that White had played 1 in Dia. 38, Black had answered with 2 to 6, White had made an odd extension at 7, Black had cut at 8, and White had played 9. Although Black 8 is a mistake, this sequence fails to threaten Black's corner, so it is unsatisfactory for White.




Dia. 38

My whole strategy in this area was a mistake, but with White 62, at least I should have cut at 1 in Dia. 39 and fought the ko more strongly. When White retakes the ko with 11, in that diagram, 12 is about the best Black can do. If White then ends the ko with 13, getting a fairly large territory in the top left, he doesn't have a bad result. If Black closes the corner with 14, White can escape with 15. Next if Black plays 'a', White has an attachment tesuji at 'b'.


Before White 64, why not force by giving atari at 65?

If White plays 1 in Dia. 40, then when he




Dia. 39

ko: 6, 11; 13: connects left of 3.



Dia. 40



Dia. 41

grips the black stone with 3, Black will attack at the key point with 4. The sequel from 5 to 8 seems bad for White.

How about pushing up with White 68, as in Dia. 41?


Black will extend at 2 and White can link up with 3. This is indeed playable. In fact, it may be more playable than White 68. The idea of White 68 was to undermine Black's corner and start a fight.

What if Black plays a double hane with 79 at 80?

White cuts at 2 in Dia. 42 and extends at 4. Black can capture the top with 5 and 7, but his right-side group seems to be in for a pretty rough time after White 8. Note that White can play 'a' or 'b' in sente. Also, if Black's exit into the center becomes blocked, White can descend to 'c' and make Black capture him. The overall result in this diagram is not profitable for Black.

What was the meaning of Black 89?


White 88 threatened to barricade Black at



Dia. 42


'a'. Black 89 was a tesuji to prevent that.

Why doesn't White push out at 1 in Dia. 43 with 90? Surely it can't be good for him to give up those three stones.



Dia. 43

After White 1 in Dia. 43, Black will block at 2 in Dia. 44, forcing White to go back to 3. Then if White cuts at 5, Black makes the diagonal connection at 6 and 8. (If White does



Dia. 44

not cut at 5, Black 'a' is severe.) White will now be attacked in the center with nothing to attack back against, a sure way to lose the game.

White 1 at 'a' in Dia. 43 is not good either. Black can connect at 1, for example. White 90 in the figure abandoned the stones in the centre top and struck out in a new direction toward the center.





Figure 4 (93 - 135)


Figure 4 (93 - 135)

With 98, can't White connect at 99?

White 1 in Dia. 45 (or either of the knight's connections marked 'a') would be the ordinary move, but then Black would take large points at 2 and 4, and White would be badly behind. I felt that my only chance was to jump to 98 and try to change the flow of the game by inviting the cut at 99.



Dia. 45




Dia. 46

Instead of cutting at 99, what if Black takes a large point on the lower side?

White 98 threatened the thrust at 1 in Dia. 46. If Black plays 2, White gains freedom and contains Black with 3 to 9, a terrible development for Black. (Next, if Black plays 'a', White cuts at 'b'.) The cut at 99 was designed to prevent this and ensconce Black in the lead. In the moves from 100 on, both sides fought all out: White to keep Black's center separated from the lower left and Black to break up White's shape in every possible way.

For Black 119, how about a move at 120?




Dia. 47

White would divide Black with 2 in Dia. 47, and the fighting would just get worse. White is all in favor of fighting, because he can attack Black's large group at 'a'.

Before playing 119, what if Black plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 48?


Those are a pair of good moves. In Dia. 48, Black 'a' will be answered by White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'.



Dia. 48


In playing 119 Black's plan was to secure his own base and deprive the white center group of eye space, then settle the game by cutting at 121. However, through 120 White had succeeded in complicating the situation, although Black was perhaps still somewhat ahead.

If Black played 129 at 1 in Dia. 49, making miai of Black 'a' and 'b', wouldn't White be in trouble?




Dia. 49

Black 1 looks good until you see the clever reply at White 2. With this it is Black, not White, who collapses. Continuing, if Black makes the bamboo joint at 3 in Dia. 50, White thrusts sideways at 4. Black cannot link up to the top: the triangled stone is in just the right place to stop him. If he pushes through and cuts with 5 and 7, White gives atari at 8 and connects at 10. Black can neither escape nor make two eyes; the game is over. If Black pushes through and cuts first with 3 and 5 in Dia. 51, White plays 6



Dia. 50




Dia. 51


and 8 as before. Black 9 appears to link up, but not so — White 10 makes 'a' and 'b' miai and Black collapses again. White was lucky that the position was set up this way.

What was the idea of White 134?

To play White 3 (or 'a') in Dia. 52 if Black answered 1 at 2. Then if Black cut at 4, White could play 5. The effect of White 1 becomes apparent after Black 6 and



Dia. 52




Dia. 53

White 7: Black cannot cut at 'b' so he is captured. Black 135 in the figure was therefore a necessary reply to White 134.

Can't White play 134 at 1 in Dia. 53?

That is the strongest move, and I was rather tempted to try it, but there wasn't time to read it out fully. In retrospect, it seems to work. Suppose Black answers at 2 in Dia. 53, threatening to link with 'a'. White wedges in at 3, and answers Black 4 by descending at 5. Black must capture at 6, and White plays 7. Next if Black cuts at 8 in Dia. 54 (top of next column), White 9 forces Black 10. After White 11, the game depends on the difficult question of whether both the bottom black groups can live. If White can capture either of them, he wins. Note that White 9 at 10 loses — Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' — but if Black plays 10 at 'd', then White 10 works, and White wins the capturing race.

Black's strongest resistance is to play 8 as



Dia. 54

in Dia. 55 (bottom of page), then cut at 10 and answer White 11 at 12, but when White connects at 13, Black cannot win. His best continuation is the hane at Black 14 in Dia. 56, but White uses the wedge tesuji at 17 and comes out one move ahead, as the sequence in Dia. 57 shows.

Figure 5 (136 – 196) (next page)


I had been planning the attack at 38 since the time I played Δ , and when I got sente to carry it out, I felt I had regained my footing. Black defended skillfully with 39 to 53, but by first pressing in against this group, then shifting back to 54, White forged into the lead.

What happens if Black blocks with 55 at 56?


He can't do that. White cuts at 2 in Dia. 58, and if Black connects at 3, White 4 captures the whole center group.

With Black 59, how about connecting at 60?


If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 59, he has



Dia. 55



Dia. 56



Dia. 57






Figure 5 (136 - 196)

89: ko




Dia. 58



Dia. 59

trouble with White 2. Next, if Black plays 'a', White plays 'b'.

Couldn't Black have held out longer by playing 63 at 1 in Dia. 60 and living in the corner with 3 to 9?



Dia. 60

Dia. 60 is undoubtedly better for Black than the actual game, but if we imagine White capturing a stone in sente with 6 and 8, then continuing with the endgame moves through 22, Black has no hope of giving the komi.

What was the aim of Black 63?

If White played 64 at 65, Black was planning to live by jumping down to 64. White 64 took care of that, however. If Black continues with 65 at 66, White plays 65, and Black can no longer secure life.

Surely there were bigger moves available than Black 77.

If Black omits 77, White kills him with a wedge at 'a'.

Black resigned at White 96. If he had played on, White would have won by two or three points on the board, without the komi.

This game began with an oversight by Black in the opening, but then a spell of bad play by White put Black into the lead. After that, White had to struggle hard to get back into contention, and only succeeded in staging an upset towards the end. It was a lucky win.

Black resigns after White 196.

('Gekkan Gogaku', July 1981. Translated by James Davies).

19th Judan Title

After losing four straight in the Kisei title match, Otake Judan made an about-face and defended his Judan title with three straight wins over Hashimoto Shoji of the Kansai Ki-in. Hashimoto had won the right to challenge Otake by defeating Kobayashi Koichi twice — once in the winners' section (see GW24) and then in a rematch after Kobayashi had defeated Honda Kunihi 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in in the losers' section final. This was not Hashimoto's first appearance in a Judan title match, for he won the 12th title in 1974 and then unsuccessfully challenged Kato for the title two years ago (see GW14, GW15).

Game One

White: Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan

Black: Otake Hideo Judan

Komi: 5½ Time: 6 hours each

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 4 March 1981

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan

Figure 1 (1 – 34). A pro's attach-and-extend joseki

Black 13 — Black 21. The attach-and-extend joseki is unusual in professional games but is possible here because of the presence of Black 11. After White 18, pushing with Black 19 and 21 (1 and 3 in Dia. 1) is mandatory. The variation with Black 1 in Dia. 1 at 'a' also exists, but it is limited to handicap go. Pushing with 1 and 3 without the marked stone, however, would be terrible






Figure 1 (1 – 34)




Dia. 1

because White makes too much territory along the fourth line. Since this joseki is useful in both even games and handicap go, it is worth taking a closer look at.

If the marked stone in Dia. 2 is already in place in a handicap game, the resulting Black strength is so imposing that it nearly assures him of victory. After Black 3 in Dia. 1, Black 1 in Dia. 2 is the vital point. If White answers at 2, then Black pushes against White with 3. A kosumi by White at 'a' would not worry Black, so it is not likely that he will allow himself to be pushed around like this. Black must be careful with the timing of 1 because it is possible for White to resist with 'b' (Black usually answers at 'c').




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

If White does play elsewhere, then Black has the knight's move at 1 in Dia. 3. White lives with 2 through 6, but Black can reduce him to a mere two eyes with the forcing moves to 13.

Black 29. The extension to 30, bringing Black's thickness to life, would be more usual.



Dia. 4





Figure 2 (35 - 71)


White 32, White 34. This combination, which attempts to play both at the top and in the center, is typical of Hashimoto's style, but it did not meet with the approval of other professionals. Jumping into the center directly with 1 in Dia. 4, then playing the kosumi at 3 if Black jumps in at 2, seems to be better.

Figure 2 (35 - 71). Black defends solidly.

Black 51. Black does not have time to play 1 in Dia. 5 before defending with Black 51: instead of defending at 'a', White will take sente with the sequence to 9 in order to get the first move on the left.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Black 51 probably seems wasteful. Can't Black turn the left-side moyo into territory by playing one of the x-marked points in Dia. 6 instead of 1?

The best starting points for closing the moyo



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

are 1 and 'a' in Dia. 7. If White pushes through and cuts with 2 through 6, Black has nothing to fear, provided he answers underneath with 5 and 7. White, however, will start with the invasion at 2 in Dia. 8, the vital point in this shape. The invader cannot be caught. Black protects against the push-through at 'a' with 3, but after White forces with 4, he gets a well-developed position with 6. If Black persists with 7 through 13, White lives comfortably up to 14. This would be unbearable for Black. Moreover, Black 1 and 9 become funny moves. A moyo that is flimsily constructed is not the real thing.


Once it has become clear that Black has to defend, he should set about making the strongest shape. Defending at 'a' in the figure still leaves the invasion at 'b', while defending around 'c' alters the yose in this part of the board. They are only half-measures, so the conclusion is that Black 51 is the proper move.

Black 57. Otake claimed that his move was slack



Dia. 9


and thought that 1 in Dia. 9 was much better. If White answers at 2, Black plays 3 and 5. After 6, Black has sente to make the attachment at 'a' or the capping move at 'b'. In addition, he is able to make an eye at 'c' and does not feel particularly threatened by the white hane at 'd'. If White switches 6 to 'e', Black has a nice move at 'f'. Because Black 57 is biased to defense only, White gets sente to remove the black threat at 'a' with the White 58 – Black 59 exchange in the figure.




Dia. 10

Black 61 – White 62. When Black plays 61, White is able to gobble up the lone black stone and make the game close. Instead of 61, Black can easily rescue the marked stone with the skillful sequence in Dia. 10. This would be big because it converts white territory into black territory; it also allows White to play first on the left with 8, which is disquieting. Black of course wants to play at 'a'.


Black 69. The largest point. Black 1 in Dia. 11 may seem larger, but although Black closes off a big center territory, White's sente hane and connection outweighs Black's gains. If Black fails to defend, White will attach at 1 in Dia. 12, then cut at 3 when Black descends. After filling in Black's liberties with 9 and 11, he cuts at 13 and



Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13





Figure 3 (72 - 103)

captures two black stones.

Figure 3 (72 - 103). The losing move?

White 72. White seems to feel confident that his chances are good in a battle of moyos. An alternative which Kudo preferred was the invasion at 90, since it seems unlikely this stone will be captured. Because White wins easily if Black attaches at 94, Black will probably intercept at 'a'. White can now move in with 72 which seems to give him more chances than playing 72 directly.

White 86 – Black 89. White 86 is often a tesuji, but in this game it is probably the losing move. Although sente, Black's stones become completely safe while White loses sente reducing moves from the outside. Instead of 86, White should force with 1 and 3 in Dia. 13, then threaten Black's territory with 5. After Black defends, White can



Dia. 14

force with 9 and 11 and still retain sente. After Black 89 the game becomes difficult for White.

White 90. White has no choice. If he hanes at 1 in Dia. 14, Black will cut with 2 instead of answering underneath and then play atari from the outside. If White hanes at 'a' after 6, the result is ko, but White has little hope of benefitting from it.




Figure 4 (104 - 155)

22: takes ko; 32: connects at 17

Figure 4 (104 - 155), Figure 5 (156 - 213). *Otake maintains his advantage.*

From the beginning this game was a game of moyo-building, and the lack of fighting indicates that each player felt confident that his prospects for winning such a contest were good. Nevertheless, when Hashimoto made a mistake with White 86 in figure 3, the outcome, though predictably




Figure 5 (156 - 213)

106: connects at 79

close, seemed clear. Although the final margin was one and a half points, it should have been only half a point as Hashimoto lost a point with 102 in figure 5.

Black wins by 1½ points.

('Igo Club', May 1981. Translated by David Thayer)

Game Two

White: Otake

Black: Hashimoto

Played at the Seiryō Hotel in Higashi Osaka on 19 March 1981

Commentary by Otake




Figure 1 (1 - 26)

Figure 1 (1 – 26). *The right side dictates the flow.*

White 10. If White attaches at 'a' in this fuseki, Black can make good use of his stones on the right by playing the avalanche pattern at 'c' instead of blocking at 'b'. Otake played the pincer at 10 so as to be able to move toward the right with 12 and 14.

Black 15. Black too is thinking about the right side. The usual sequence would be Black 'd'—White 'e'—Black 'f'—White 'g'—Black 'h'.

Black 17—Black 21. This manner of making life is Kitani-style.

White 22. The two-space high approach move is unusual nowadays. Otake: "Up to Black 21 the game has been easy to understand. The diagonal connection at 'i' would be solid, but I didn't really want to play it. On the other hand, White 'j' would let Black become strong with 'k'. Since the white extension at the bottom is narrow, White 22 seemed to be all right."

Black 25. Another calm move. It and Black 23 make it possible for Black to shoot out to 'l'.

Figure 2 (27 – 65). *Making the opponent use up his time*

Black 27. Otake thought that the ordinary answer at 1 in Dia. 1 would have been better. Black could then aim at the big moves at 'a' and 'b', or he could jump out to 'c'. Answering Black 27 at 'a' in the figure is passive, so White defiantly switches to 28. He could also have attacked at 29.

Black 29. The only move.






Figure 2 (27 – 65)



Dia. 1

Black 31. Black challenges White to a fight. If he defends at 44 instead, he gets a dismal result when White strengthens himself on the outside at 'b'. Perhaps the ordinary attack would be Black 'b'. Otake said that if he had been Black he would not have settled the position so definitely. He generally finds slower-paced attacks more troublesome.

White 38. This peep took the professionals following the game completely by surprise. It must have been unexpected for Hashimoto too, because he settled down to think about it for an hour and a half before answering with Black 39. Otake explained that the only virtue of the peep was that it made his opponent use up his time, and gave White 1 in Dia. 2 as the normal move. After the sequence to 19 (19 could also be at 'a') White would not want to have already played moves in the upper left. Moreover, White 38 becomes a peep at an uncuttable point after Black 43.



Dia. 2

White 52. Sonoda 9-dan, who was giving the public commentary, thought this move a little slack and suggested White 'a'—Black 53—White 54—Black 'c'. Otake said he played 52 as a backup against fighting in the upper right, but he admitted that it was off-target.

Black 53. An excellent move that becomes a ladder-block when Black plays 63.

Black 55, Black 57. Black 55 is painful, but being able to play 57 gives Black a territorial advantage.

Black 61, Black 63. Both moves show good timing. Black 61 gives Black the aji of the 'e' to 'i' sequence after he plays 'd'. Black 63 is severe.

After Black 63 the pace of Hashimoto's play picked up as he only had two hours and twenty minutes left (Otake still had over four hours).

Figure 3 (66 – 119). *Hashimoto tries too hard.*

White 66—Black 79. A painful sequence for White. Not only does Black make ten certain points in the corner, he also has the aji of the attachment at 'a' to look forward to; for example, if White hanes at 114, Black can cut at 'b'. Otake estimated that White needed twenty to thirty points in the center in order to win.

White 86—Black 87. *Miai*. If White expands his territory at the bottom by attaching at 'c', Black will be able to turn at 'd', weakening the four white stones above.

Black 95. Hashimoto regretted this move and said he should have exchanged Black 102 for White 'e' first.

White 96—White 100. White feels more com-





Figure 3 (66 – 119)

fortable having a second eye in gote should Black attack at 'f'.

White 104. White should capture at 'g', according to Otake. He would still have the play-in at 'h' to aim at, as well as the large connection underneath with the sequence White 'i'—Black 'j'—White 'k'. Before crossing under with 'k', however, White would first force Black to answer in the lower left corner at 'm' and 'o' with 'l' and 'n', a yose sequence whose existence made it possible for White to discard his three corner stones earlier.


Black 107—White 114. Black 107 is a sharp counterattack, but 109 and 111 were criticized because White's bad aji at the top became good aji when he played 114. Instead of Black 109 Otake recommended the sequence in Dia. 3. Playing White 114 in the figure at 'p' would be more solid, but it would give Black a forcing move at 'q'.



Dia. 3

Black 115. A strong move that brings the game to a climax.

White 116, White 118. Otake resists. Ishii 9-dan, the game referee, offered the sequence in Dia. 4 as an alternative for White 116 since the continuations seemed favourable for White. When Hashimoto saw it, however, he said he might just give up two stones by answering 5 at 'a' (White 'b' to Black 'e' would follow). Otake agreed, saying that this was not a place where Black wanted to fight. Connecting at 119 in the figure with 118 would allow Black to block at 118 and would probably lose the game, since the descent at 'i' would become an excellent point for Black.



Dia. 4





Figure 4 (120 - 168)

ko: 39, 42; 43: takes at 23; ko: 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, 63


Figure 4 (120 - 168). *An absolute ko*

White 20. Jumping directly to 22 is better as Black becomes strong with 23 and 25.


Black 29. The atari may seem natural since, with Black 23 and 25 on the board, White has no move at 'a' after White 32. However, Otake thought that Black 1 in Dia. 5 would have been more disagreeable. White 2 accomplishes nothing because of Black 3 and 5 (Black can always make an eye at 'a' if something goes wrong), so White must play in at 2 in Dia. 6, then make the empty triangle at 6. After Black lives, White will attack



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7


on a large scale at 'h'. If White omits 6, Black can get a ko after the sequence from Black 'a' to Black 'g'. If Black switches 3 to 4, White connects at 'e'.

Black 31. Black ignores White 30 and makes a ko. The connection at 1 in Dia. 7 would be usual, after which White would attach at 2 and push.


White 58. An excellent ko threat. Black has to answer at 59 to prevent White from increasing his ko threats.

Black 63. If Black continues with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8, White will finish the ko with 4 instead of answering in the center. Although Black can aim at the ko in Dia. 6, White is safe after 8 and 12: Black 'a' is answered by White 'b' and Black 'c' by White 'a'.

White 66. The capture is too small. If White had lost, White 66 would have been the losing move. The correct move is capturing at 1 in Dia. 9. If Black 2, White can cross under in style with the sequence to 9, after which White 66 and



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

4: takes ko




Figure 5 (169 - 216)

68 in the figure could be regarded as miai.

Figure 5 (169 - 216). *A doubtful move*

Black 71. After the game Hashimoto suggested that Black 75 might have been better. Yet even with 71 Black was still very much in the game, though Hashimoto began to play as if he were losing.

Figure 6 (217 - 269). *Hashimoto takes another tough loss.*

Black 31. Pushing through here is probably the losing move. Otake offered the sequence to the reverse sente yose move at 9 in Dia. 10 as the winning yose sequence. Even though Black will have to add moves at 'a' and 'b', White's center





Figure 6 (217 - 269)

41, 69: connect



Dia. 10

territory has been reduced by two points.

When the game was counted, Otake had pulled off a half-point victory. With a second win to his credit, he could look forward to the third game with confidence, while for Hashimoto the loss must have been doubly bitter because he had had numerous chances to win.

White wins by ½ point.

(‘Kido’, May 1981)



Otake takes a 2-0 lead.

Game Three

White: Hashimoto Shoji

Black: Otake Hideo

Played on 1 April 1981 at Hakone.

Commentary by Kato Tengen

Figure 1 (1 - 43) (next page). *White plays boldly.*

White 2, 4. A favourite fuseki pattern of Hashimoto's.

White 12. The diagonal hit is a determined move. If White plays the kosumi at 1 in Dia. 1,






Figure 1 (1 - 43)

the continuation to 19 can be expected and results in a different game. After 19 Black would close the corner at 'a' in the figure.

White 18. A difficult move for White. Black has already taken profit at the top with 15 and 17; consequently, White must do something on the side to try to restore the balance.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

White 22. The descent at 1 in Dia. 2 is also possible. Black can aim at blocking at 'a', but must not play there immediately because White will cut at 'b'. After the sequence to 'k' White will extend to the vicinity of 'l', the result being that Black does not seem to have gotten enough out of the position. The same position could also have been reached if Black had started fighting immediately with 21 at 26 in the figure (White 'b' and Black 24 follow).

Black 25. Black forces White down and has no



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

cause for dissatisfaction. Moreover, Black 25 is working toward the outside, while for the time being the cut at 'c' is not a worry.

Black 27. Kato preferred the taisha pressing move in Dia. 3 to the pincer at 27. If White confronts Black head-on, Black becomes strong on the outside through 17, getting an easy game. Accordingly, White must back off with 2 and 4 in Dia. 4, but this also gives Black an easy fuseki since he can close the corner at 'a' in the figure.

White 28. Otake: "I was thankful for this move. Unlike Hashimoto, I wouldn't have had the courage to play it and would have come out at 30 instead."

Black 29—Black 33. Black 29 and 31 take profit while Black 33 seeks a quick life in the corner.

White 34—White 40. Hashimoto spent an hour and twenty-one minutes on White 34. If he does not play it, Black will drive him across useless space with the knight's move at 36. Up to 40 White unflinchingly gives Black profit, the question becoming how effectively he will be able to use his outside strength in future fighting.

Figure 2 (44 - 77). A black overlay

White 48. Kato did not think blocking off the corner was very impressive and recommended playing from the center with White 'a' and 'c' (Black answers at 'b' and 'd'), then pushing at 'e'. Concealed in this sequence is the idea that Black's four corner stones are working at maximum efficiency after White 46 and 48. If so, looking to attack Black's group on the side is more to the point, especially as it utilizes White's strength at the bottom. (Hashimoto said he had wanted to play White 50 at 'a'.)

Black 57. Otake said he should have attached at 58.

Black 59. A sensible move that takes into account Black's weak center group. If he jumps out






Figure 2 (44 - 77)

at 1 in Dia. 5, White will exchange 2 for 3, then make the bothersome invasion at 4.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Black 67 - White 68. Black 67 is a smart move. White hates to answer, but if he does nothing he will be cut in two with the sequence Black 'f' - White 'g' - Black 'h' - White 'i' - Black 68.

Black 71. Playing the low move at 'j' would be steadier since it would give White fewer chances to make complications.

Black 75. A misguided move which aims at the corner too soon. Black 75 has to be the high diagonal move at 'k'. Otake proposed pulling back at 'l' because 1 and 3 in Dia. 6 are sente against the corner, making the invasion sequence to 11 a possibility. If Black fails to answer White 3, he has to fight a ko to the right of White 9 in Dia. 7 after the sequence to White 13. Note that Black is prevented from making the move he would like to because of a shortage of liberties.



Dia. 7

13: at 11

White 76. White chooses to attack with the peep.








Figure 3 (78 - 101)

Figure 3 (78 - 101). *Two missed opportunities*

White 78. The first miss. If White strengthens himself by exchanging 1 for 2 in Dia. 8, he can aim at the attachment at 3. If White then plays the hane at 4, White lives on the side with the sequence to 9 and gets a good game. In place of 7, White also has the good combination of White 'a' - Black 'b' - White 'c'. If Black defends with the attachment at 2 in Dia. 9 instead of with the hane in Dia. 8, White flattens him down up to 12, then switches to the peep at 'a' in the figure. This gives a close game with fair chances for White. Because of White 78 in the figure, Black is able to play 81 and 83 in good order and force White to take gote in the corner. (If White omits 86, the peep at 'b' puts him on the spot and makes Black 75 into a good move.) Furthermore, 81 has created a serious cutting point in Black's



Dia. 8




Dia. 9


shape at 'c'.

Black 87, Black 89. The hane and connection are too early. Protecting the side at 'd' would give him a good lead.

White 96. Because Black has not defended the side, White invades, precipitating a crisis.




Dia. 10




Dia. 11

White 98. The second miss. White should hane underneath at 1 in Dia. 10 because it sets up the crawling tesuji at 3; after sacrificing two stones, he is able to cut at 7. Since Black is destroyed by White 9 if he pulls back at 8, he must give way up to the connection at 6 in Dia. 11. With 7 and 9, however, White devastates the side while putting Black under attack.

Instead of 4 in Dia. 10, Black might try to capture White outright with 2 in Dia. 12; however, if he connects solidly at 6 and then takes White's eyes with 8, he will lose the fight by one move after White 13. Letting White live at 8 by switching Black 8 to 9 makes White's invasion a success since Black must add a move at 'a' to ensure the life of his own group.



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

12, 22: connect

If Black replaces the solid connection at 6 in Dia. 12 with the diagonal connection at 2 in Dia. 13, White's extension at 7 will be very difficult to handle. Though Black wins the semeai by cutting at 8, White is glad to play 11 to 17, then squeeze with 19 and 21. Capturing two black stones with the descent at 25 (the cut at 'a' is answered by White 'b') and connecting at 27 make the result a good one for White.


Many other variations are possible, but as long as White has an attack on Black's side group around 'e' in the figure he can play strongly — provided he has played the hane at 1 in Dia. 10. In the game sequence Black was able to take the vital point at 99, then cross under at 101. White had accomplished little.

Figure 4 (102 – 149). *The outcome is decided.*

Black 3, Black 5. The black group is now safe.

White 6. If the hane at 23, Black extends at 10 and cannot be caught.

White 8. If White plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 14, Black will connect underneath with 4 and 6. The ponnuki capture at 7 is large, but the connection at 8 is also large. White does not gain.



Dia. 14




Figure 4 (102 – 149)





Figure 5 (150 – 221)

Black 21, Black 23. Aim at the placement at 'a'.

Black 33 – White 40. Black 33 wraps up the

game for Black as White must add a move in the corner at 40. If White plays elsewhere, Black can force a ko with the sequence to 9 in Dia. 15 (White throws in at 'a' to start the ko). If White connects at 7 with 6,




Dia. 15

Black kills the corner with the descent at 6.

Black 41. Should be at 48. If White connects at 'b', Black can come back to 41.

Figure 5 (150 – 221). *White is too far behind.*

White 50. The sequence in Dia. 16 is also possible and would have made the outcome closer.



Dia. 16

Black 51. An interesting move that allows Black to capture two stones with Black 65.

Black 63. Unnecessary; Black 'a' is better.

White resigns after 221.

('Kido', June 1981. Translated by David Thayer)

Michael Redmond's Professional Debut

Below we present the Redmond game from the insei league which was promised for our previous issue, together with two of his games as a professional shodan. Michael finished the insei league with a score of ten wins to five losses, which secured him fourth place. Since the top seven place-getters were slated to become professional shodan, this was a comfortable result. Michael is the first Westerner to earn professional status in the fiercely-competitive insei promotion tournament, and he becomes the second Western professional, after James Kerwin of the U.S., at the Nihon Ki-in (Manfred Wimmer 2-dan of Austria retired from the Kansai Ki-in at the end of last year). It will be interesting to see if Michael can emulate James Kerwin's success in winning the 1-dan section of the Kisei tournament.

Michael made an excellent start as a professional with an opening dash of four wins to one loss. Unfortunately, he was unable to maintain this pace, and his record now stands at 6-4, but this is still a very satisfactory performance. In an unofficial game, played at a summer go seminar for amateur players, Michael managed to defeat Sakata Eio 9-dan by 4½ points, taking a two-stone handicap. This result is well above par for a shodan, since Sakata is one of the top two or three players of this century, and we hope to present the game in a later issue.

Below are Michael's complete results to date.

1. (June 3 — Tengen). Beat Yoshida Yoichi 4-dan by 4½ points with white.
2. (June 10 — Oza). Lost to Inoue Machiko 2-dan by 5½ points with white.
3. (June 17 — Judan). Beat Hasegawa Kayoko 1-dan by 9½ points with black.
4. (July 1 — Tengen). Beat Shiratori Sumiko 4-dan by resignation with black.
5. (July 15 — oteai). Beat Tei Meiki 1-dan by resignation with black.
6. (July 22 — Judan). Lost to Ishikura Noboru 2-dan by 6½ points with white.
7. (August 12 — oteai). Beat Shinkai Hiroko 2-dan by 5 points with black.
8. (August 19 — Tengen). Lost to Hidaka Toshiyuki 2-dan by 7½ points with white.
9. (September 2 — oteai). Lost to Komatsu Hideki 1-dan by 13 points with white.
10. (September 9 — oteai). Beat Ninomiya Hideko 1-dan by 1 point with black.

Michael's good results in the oteai so far — three wins to one loss — give him good prospects of an early promotion to 2-dan. When asked about his style, Michael commented that his forte was middle game fighting, but that he was not satisfied with his fuseki. Let's see how that is borne out by the games below.

Redmond v. Komatsu

White: Michael Redmond

Black: Komatsu Hideki

Date: 12th January, 1981. Tournament for promotion to shodan. White wins by 9½ points.

Commentary by Michael Redmond

Figure 1 (1 — 52)

Black 9. A tsuke at 'a' is another possibility.

The 11 — 12 exchange is bad for Black, as it weakens his niren-sei formation. (Without this exchange, a move around 'b' would be a large move for Black.

Black 13 is a mistake: it leaves bad aji, as illustrated in Dias. 1 and 2. With this move, 'c' or 14 would be normal.





Figure 1 (1 — 52)



Dia. 1

14 at 6, 17 at 8, 19 at 6

Dia. 1. If White plays 1 to 5 here, Black 6 is a tesuji and up to 20 Black gets a good result. White can play at 7 with 5, but Black plays at 5 and, although there is bad aji, it does not work for White as it stands. Thus, White must wait until later in the game when white stones may come in the vicinity of this group.

Dia. 2. White 1 here is another way of playing, but this does not work yet.

Black 19. I think that 19 should be at 42 — this is the natural continuation after 17. With 20, I should have played at 22. After the 20–21 exchange the follow-up of White ‘d’—Black ‘e’—White ‘f’ is necessary.

I cannot agree with the 23–25–29 sequence. Up to 32 White looks good. However, this is a difficult point for Black, and though 23 at 28 would be normal, that is also playable for White.

Black 35 is ridiculous: Black must connect at 41.


Black 37 is another mistake: ‘g’ would have been better. Komatsu must have been shocked at his 35. Up to 44 this is a great success for White.

Black naturally started a fight with 45 and 47. Perhaps 48 was a little too vigorous. Instead —

Dia. 3. White 1 to 7 would be a safer way of playing. What’s more, Black has to be careful, as the bad aji of his group on the right is becoming dangerous.

White 52 was bad suji. Simply jumping to ‘h’ is a good move.

Dia. 4. If White 1, Black 2 is the natural move, but 3 makes miai of the corner and the side. If Black 4, White 5 is a strong attack. The moves to 10 are virtually forced, but after 11 Black has




Dia. 2




Michael Redmond


Born 25th May, 1963. Family lives in Santa Barbara, California. Visited Japan in 1976, then a 3-dan, returned in September, 1977, to become an insei. Missed out on promotion by 1 point last year, but made it with a 10–5 score this year. Is a disciple of Oeda Yusuke 8-dan.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

two cutting points to defend.

Dia. 5. If Black protects the side with 4 here, 5 and 7 give White a large profit in the corner.





Figure 2 (53 - 112)
80, 83: ko



Dia. 6 20, 23: ko
Figure 2 (52 - 100)


White 56. White threatens a sagari at 64 next, so Black 57 is natural. Instead –

Dia. 6. If Black plays at 1, White 4 is severe, as it takes away Black's eyes at the same time as it cuts him off from the corner. Black 13 is a tesuji. Up to 23, a ko results, but this is bad for Black as White has ko threats such as 24. If Black plays 19 at 22, White 19 makes miai of 'a' and 21. Instead of 1 –


Dia. 7. If Black 1, White 2 is a nice answer. White 10 kills the black group to the right. If Black plays 1 at 3, then White 6 – Black 7 – White 10 still kills the side group.

Black 63 is a strong move. If Black answers submissively with 1 in Dia. 8, White's continuation to 10 is painful for Black.


White 64. This was a terrible mistake. It is embarrassing to see how shallow my reading was. Instead of 65 Black could have just taken White's two stones with Black 70; as White can't stop Black's side group from escaping into the centre, this would be disastrous for White. Black 65 saved



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

me. Apparently Komatsu also misread the fight in Dia. 9.

Dia. 9. Black should simply play at 1 here. White has no choice but to try to stop Black from getting out to the centre with 4 to 8, but Black 11 is a tesuji and White dies after Black 17.

Instead of 64, I should have played 1 in Dia. 10, but in the actual game I did not notice this move.

Dia. 10. If Black plays nobi at 7 instead of 6, White will push at 17, threatening 'a'. I think that the result up to 17 is likely, although there are some complications. This is much better than playing 64 in the game, though it is gote.

Black 85. Finishing off the ko is reasonable, but continuing it by playing at 86 is also possible.

Dia. 11. Black 1 leads to very difficult variations. The sequence to 22 is just one possibility. This looks playable for White, but Black might not play this way. For example, Black might cut at 'a' instead of 21. Although I was thinking of this during the game, I was relieved when Black finished the ko with 85.


Black 93. Black lives with this move (if White 'a', Black 'b'), but there is some bad aji.

Dia. 12. If White gets thick in the centre, the sequence from 1 to 5 becomes possible. If Black 'a', White 'b' kills the group.

I decided that the centre was large, so I built thickness with 100 to 112.

Figure 3 (113 - 160)

Black chiseled down my framework from 13 to 28, and then he jumped in at 29. My central strategy was beginning to look bad, and I faltered with 30. I should have exchanged White 31 for Black



Dia. 11
ko: 5, 8, 11, 14, 17




Figure 3 (113 - 160)
53: connects at 44

39 before playing 30. Black 31 surprised me and here I entirely lost my lead. The exchange up to 34 is kikashi for Black.

Black 37 was an overplay which became the losing move. Black should have played at 40. After 42, Black was in trouble.

Black 43 etc. Black searches for a weakness in White's position.

White 56. I missed a chance to finish off the game quickly. I should have played 56 at 57, making miai of 56 and 'a'.

Figure 4 (161 - 200)

Komatsu apparently overlooked 66. If Black plays 67 at 68, White 67 kills the group. Note




Figure 4 (161 - 200)

that 67 instead of 66 does not kill Black, as Black plays at 87.

After 70, I was confident that I had a won game. Actually, Black was ahead on the board, but White's win with the komi was secure. Black made many mistakes in the yose after this.

Figure 5 (201 - 264)

White wins by 9½ points.





Figure 5 (201 - 264)
64: connects (left of 6)



Dia. 12

Redmond v. Yoshida

White: Michael Redmond 1-dan

Black: Yoshida Yoichi 4-dan

Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

Date: 3rd June, 1981. 8th Tengen, 1st preliminary round. White wins by 4½ points.

Commentary by Michael Redmond




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 13 should be at 'a', as 13 leaves a weakness at 1 in Dia. 1. However, it is not good for White to cut immediately, as the sequence to 8 is good for Black.

White 14 is to prevent Black from getting a nice moyo here with a move at 15. I also considered playing boshi at 15.

Black 15 is the strongest reply to 14. The shape from 16 to 20 is common, but 21 should be at 'b', as that would strengthen Black's connection to the upper left corner.


Black 25 was a mistake. Black should play at 33 instead. Black 31 should also be at 33.

Playing at 33 after the 31 – 32 exchange lacks fighting spirit. Black must counterattack at 1 in Dia. 2, but even so, the shape up to 8 is good for White. This shows that 31 was an overplay.

White 40 was a slack move. I should have taken Black's three stones by playing at 42. I gave Black the chance to complicate the game with 41 to 47.

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Black 57 was bad. Playing at 90 would be better. If White 'a', Black could then play 79 to



Dia. 1

Dia. 2





Figure 2 (51 – 100)



Dia. 3


Dia. 4

protect against the peep at 'b'.


Black 63. Black can't connect at 1 in Dia. 3. White 2 is a tesuji and Black 3, 5 and 7 are forced. White connects at 8 and the game is finished. Thus Black took a loss on the side, but he intended to connect up in sente with 65, threatening to take the corner with 1 to 5 in Dia. 4. I could have protected the corner, but I decided to attack Black's centre group. 69 to 74 is the natural flow of stones.

Black could not win protecting his group, so he played 77 and 79 in sente and came into the san-san with 81.

Black 87. Black should have simply played at




Dia. 5



Dia. 6

1 in Dia. 5. After 2, Black connects at 3; White must protect at 4, and Black 5 gives him an easy life. This way the game is playable for Black. Letting White capture the stone with 94 gave back White's lead.

White 98 was a bad mistake. I should have exchanged 1 for 2 in Dia. 6, and then played the osae of 3. Black has only one eye in the centre. If Black forces from 4 to 12, it looks like the watari on the lower side and Black 17 are miai, but 13 is a tesuji. White reduces Black's eyes in sente and gets to play 19. Thus Black must make one more eye on the upper side. White 98 let Black attack White first with 99.



Dia. 7

Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Black 5. Black 1 in Dia. 7 is better. White can't cut at 'a', so I planned to play 2 to 6. Next Black can take the lower left corner.

I took sente up to 17, and with 18 I felt sure I was ahead.

Black started a ko with 31 and gained a little in the furikawari of 52 for 53, but with 56 I felt I was safely ahead.

Figure 4 (151 – 200)

With Black 57 a play at 66 would have compli-




Figure 3 (100 – 150)

ko: 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50




Figure 4 (151 – 200)

cated the game. 67 and 72 are miai.

After 72, my lead is obvious.

98 and 1 in Figure 5 are miai.

Figure 5 (201 – 304) (next page)

The ko fight from 32 to 87 made no difference to the outcome.

White had a slight advantage throughout the middle game, and my win was decided in the fighting from 82 in Figure 2 to 18 in Figure 3.

White wins by 4½ points.




Figure 5 (201 – 304)

ko: 15, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53; 54: at 48;
55: takes; ko: 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77;
79: left of 72; ko: 80, 83; 87: connects ko;
97: connects (left of 27); 103: connects (below
101); 104: ko (right of 21).

White wins and connects the ko.

Redmond v. Shiratori

White: Shiratori Sumiko 4-dan

Black: Michael Redmond 1-dan

Date: 1st July, 1981. 8th Tengen, 1st preliminary round. White resigns.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho 9-dan

This is Michael's second game in the first preliminary round of the Tengen tournament. His opponent is the veteran woman player Shiratori Sumiko (b. 1919), who became a professional in 1949.

Figure 1 (1 – 40)

White 8. This move is a joseki, but it is not usually considered very good. The standard moves are White 'a' and 'b'.

Black 9. The standard response to 8. At one time the difficult variation Black 10 – White 9 – Black 15 was popular, but recently the Black 9–11 combination is more common.

White 16. If at 1 in Dia. 1, the exchange to 10 would probably follow, and Black would build useful thickness. The result is almost the same as the small avalanche (konadare) joseki shown in Dia. 2. The ▲ stone in Dia. 1 is just a little over-concentrated, but that does not matter, since Black's position is a line higher than in Dia. 2.

White 20 aims at the cut at 'c', but White 1 in Dia. 3 seems preferable. White might play 3 at 5, but either way she gets a couple more points than







Figure 1 (1 – 40)




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


in the game. Even so, Black's thickness makes this a satisfactory result for him.

White 22. White 'd' is better.


Black 23 is a good move locally, but from the point of view of the whole board, switching to 'e' (or one line lower) at the top would give Black a nice position. With either 24 or 26, making an approach move at 'f' would work well for White.

Black 25. Black 1 in Dia. 4 does not work. White has the tesuji of 6.


White 26 is unnecessary. It may prevent Black from blocking at 26 in sente, but Black can still force with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5. Once the exchange to 4 had been made, White would not want to exchange 'a' for Black 'b'.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

The result to 27 is satisfactory for Black, considering that he has stones in the adjacent corners.

White 28 is a mistake in direction. The bottom is small: Black does not have much potential there, since he is open to the right. If White is going to make an approach move in this corner, she should play at 'g', but the top right corner is more important. White 1 in Dia. 6 seems best.

Dia. 6. White 1 to 5 counter the influence of Black's thickness. White might even be able to aim at cutting at 'a'.

Black 29 shows good fighting spirit, but since 28 was a mistake in direction, Black could just ignore it. Taking up position with 'e' is still the best move. Also, there would be nothing wrong with answering tamely with 1 and 3 in Dia. 7. Black does not mind if White settles herself here, since this area was not important to begin with.

Figure 2 (41 – 67)

White 46. White gets into too much trouble trying to save her four stones, so she would be better off discarding them. For example, she could secure the corner with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8, then switch to 5. Her four stones look dead, but they







Figure 2 (41 – 67)



Dia. 8



Dia. 9




Dia. 10


still have a little aji. Note that blocking at 2 in Dia. 9 instead only gives Black terrible shape.

Black 63 is too tight – it is Black's first dubious move of the game. This is Black's chance to force with 1 in Dia. 10. The question of whether or not Black can play this move has a very big effect on the outcome of the game. Letting White play 64 was a bad slip for Black.


Dia. 10. If White counters with 2 and 4, Black



Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

5 is a nice answer. It makes miai of capturing a stone with 'a' and playing the Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd' combination in the corner. White would therefore have to compromise with 2 to 6 in Dia. 11, but Black 7 is sente against the corner. This result would guarantee a win for Black.

Black 65 is also too tight and too slow. More attractive for Black would be attacking White with the 1-3 combination in Dia. 12. However, Black is given a second chance to follow Dia. 12

when White answers at 66, a move which is just as slow as Black 65. White should seize the opportunity to escape lightly with 1 and 3 in Dia. 13.

Black 67. The actual exchange of 66 for 67 is a gain for Black, but capping at 1 in Dia. 12 is still preferable.





Figure 3 (68 - 117)



Dia. 14


Figure 3 (68 - 117)

White 68. White 69 would be the proper move, but White plays all-out because she is behind. Black 69 is a severe attack, but White must have been prepared for it. (69 could also be the shoulder-hit on tengen.)

Black 75 and 77 are over-concentrated. If Black wants to attack at 77, he should omit 75.

Black 81 is meant to be severe, but the result is that White easily settles herself at the top with 82 and 84. Following Dia. 14 would be better: this way the white group would remain unsettled. Note also that forcing White to connect at 2 would redeem Black's peep at 75 in the figure.

White 82. White has a more positive way of playing here, that is, the atari at 1 in Dia. 15.



Dia. 15

Dia. 5. Black cannot give White a ponnuki, so he has to play at 2. If White 3, Black can squeeze with 4 to 10, then attack at 12. The game would then be decided by whether White can save her group. The way to go about it would be White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'. White would be in for a tough fight, but since she is way behind anyway, she would have nothing to lose.

Black 89, 91. Black turns from attack to surrounding territory. Considering his lead, this approach is reasonable, but 89 itself should be played at 111. White in turn should play 92 at 115.

Black 93. Black 111 is still bigger. White might live in the corner, but in the process Black would


Page from Go History (continued)

Figure 4 (146 – 199)

White 46 is a big move, but Black 49 is such a superb invasion that playing 46 at 69 might have been preferable.

Black 75 is essential. If omitted, White can play the sequence in Dia. 11.

The game record after 199 does not survive, but a jigo seems inevitable.



Dia. 11 12: connects




Figure 4 (118 – 185)

72: at 58

consolidate his right side territory. Black 111 is bigger than the corner.

Black 107. Black 111 is still the move.

White 108, 110. This attack is obviously unreasonable. White should play at 115.

Black 117 ensures life for this group and at the same time ends the game. This was a good game for Redmond, though his style does have elements of immaturity. Still, he held the lead from first to last.

White resigns after Black 185.




Figure 4 (146 – 199)

89: ko (above 86); 92: ko (at 86); 93: ko (left of 88); 99: ko (above 86)

36th Honinbo Title Match

"Once the title match starts, it's kill or be killed," said the usually optimistic Takemiya before the beginning of this best-of-seven series. Last year, when he took the Honinbo title from Kato, his pre-match statement had been "I'm going to smash Kato to smithereens." Apparently he had felt more carefree as challenger than as defender, perhaps because after winning the title (for the second time) he had vowed to hold it for ten years, but in any case his remarks mirrored his bold and open style of play. Cho, whose game is more profit-oriented and methodical, confined himself to a routine promise to do his best in each game as it came up, but added that he would feel shattered if he lost.

Game One

Black: Takemiya Masaki, Honinbo

White: Cho Chikun, Meijin

Komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

May 26–27 at Hakone





Figure 1 (1 – 38)

Figure 1 (1 – 38)


Black 11. Although neither player criticized this move after the game, Ishida's *Dictionary of Basic Joseki* calls it a mistake (Vol. 3, p. 10) and gives 13 as the correct move, followed by White 15, then Black 11.

Black 15. If Black extends at 1 in Dia. 1, White will clamp him at 2, which is why Black 11 was wrong. However, Black could continue with 3, 5, and 7, and according to one commentator (Kajiwara) should have done so. If White cuts with 6 at 'a', Black gladly responds with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. Takemiya was apparently satisfied with nullifying White 4 with 15, but although White's position was low, Black's was potentially short of liberties. For example, after 19 –

Dia. 2. White could play 1, 3, and 5. In the



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

continuation through 11, White sacrifices three stones but captures Black 6 (Black cannot connect). If Black plays 8 at 9, followed by White 8 and Black 11, White sacrifices by giving atari at 'a'. White 7 at 9, Black 10, White 'b', Black 'c', White 7 would also be possible. White has many good sequences in this area.

Black 27 prevents Dia. 2 and also prevents White from turning at 27, which would set up White 'a'. Cho had considered playing 26 at 27, but opted for territory.

Black 29 is an intentional sacrifice.

Black 37 was generally criticized. Takemiya himself labeled it as the game-losing move. Afterwards it was decided that rather than commit himself here, Black should have played 'b', leaving the option of blocking at 37, pushing at 'c', or forcing at 38 later, depending on how the game developed.

White 38 is necessary after 37, to prevent Black 'd', with the threat of 'e' and 'f', but it is also very big, restricting the action of the black stone in the bottom left corner.





Figure 2 (39 - 87)

Figure 2 (39 - 87)


Black 39 was also criticized. Takemiya speculated that he should have played 39 at 'a', to prevent White 40. Cho: 'I did not regard Black 39 as especially helpful, although it did mean that all Black's territory was in one place. If Black had played 39 on the left side, I would have played 'b'.'

White 40. Not White 1 in Dia. 3, because then Black makes an obvious pincer at 2. After 4, if White plays 'a', Black 'b' is a neat reply.

Black 41. Since this leaves White room for a two-space extension to 44, the reader may wonder, as did Takagawa, the official referee, why Black does not play 'c' instead. Cho: 'If Black plays 1 in Dia. 4, it will be difficult for him to deal with White 2 when it comes, sooner or later. If White answers Black 5 at 'a', Black



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

will play 'b', but White's intention is to cut at 6.'

White 42, Black 43. Although this exchange helps Black surround territory, it also prepares for White 64, then White 66.

Black 47 was identified as a lax move after the game. Black should have blocked at 48. Cho: 'In that case, after Black 1 to 7 in Dia. 5, I was planning to connect at 8. If Black gives atari at 9, White runs out at 10, and I think White can handle the ensuing fight.'



Dia. 5

Black 55 is necessary. Takemiya was very unhappy with this result.

White 64, Black 65. Even in building territory, the two players follow their separate styles, Cho going for the corner and Takemiya for the center.


Black 69. Haruyama, who commented on this game for the *Mainichi* newspaper, and Sakata, who did a public commentary at the Nihon Ki-in, both thought that Black should have made a capping attack at 74. Even if Black omits 69, White can do little more in the top right than descend at 71, and then Black can still defend his territory with 'd'.

White 74. An excellent jump, strengthening White's group, threatening the black group below, and preparing to reduce the black framework on the right side.

Black 77 was unavoidable. Black cannot afford to defend the center, then have White start an attack on him at 'e'.

White 86. Cho: 'This was a bad mistake. I should have captured with 1, 3, and 5 in Dia. 6. The corner territory is large, and White 'a' becomes sente, so the left-side group is protected.'

Black 87 is hard to answer. If White defends the corner, the danger exists that Black will attack at 'f'.



Dia. 6




Figure 3 (88 – 100)


Figure 3 (88 – 100)

White 88. A probe. White would like to strengthen his left-side group in sente, then block at 'a' in the top left corner.

Black 89. If Black connects at 94, White will continue at 91 and probably accomplish his aim.

Black 91. So far the game has been peaceful, but now the first fight begins. After Black 93 –

Dia. 7. White can escape with 1, 3, 5, and 7, but it does him no good to be squeezed like this.



Dia. 7




Figure 4 (101 – 144)

White 98. Brilliant, and completely unexpected.

White 100. The two black stones above are on the verge of capture and White's position has become thick, while Black's left-side group has been made contrastingly thin.

Figure 4 (101 – 144)

White 8–18. Since he is leading by about the value of the komi, Cho plays conservatively. For Takemiya, this was a game that never quite got off the ground.

Black resigns after White 144

Game Two

Black: Cho

White: Takemiya

Komi: 5½

June 3 – 4 at Yunoyama

Commentary by Sakata Eio 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 31)

Figure 1 (1 – 31)

Cho's selection of the Shusaku opening reflected his territory-oriented style, while Takemiya's inventiveness was shown by the new move at 10. Since it makes miai of a pincer at 'a' and an approach at 14, White 10 is eminently reasonable, but no one had thought of trying it up to now.

Black should have played 11 at 'b'. Then he could have answered White 12 more patiently at 'c', aiming to counterattack against White 13 with Black 16.

White 26 was a tesuji, and the sequence through 30 was necessary. Black could not play 27 at 28 and let White squeeze him with 27.




Figure 2 (32 - 61)

Figure 2 (32 - 61)

White 32 was an excellent move, which Black may have overlooked. Suppose Black captures instead of connecting at 33 -

Dia. 1. If Black captures at 1, White gets in atari at 6 and 8 before living with 10. Black has unplayably bad shape.


Black therefore had to connect at 33, and now White gave atari from the outside at 34, sacrificing four stones.

By the end of the first day of play (Black 43), White was clearly in the lead.

Black launched into the second day with a double approach at 45, then made a light defense of the upper side with 53 and 55 in order to come down at 57. White's reply at 58 was questionable. Takemiya commented afterwards that he should have pushed at 'a', which would have threatened a placement at 'b'. If Black defended against 'b', White could make a pincer on the left side. In the actual game, White let Black get ahead of him on the left side with 59 and 61, and since the top group's exit to the center was still open, the placement attack at 'b' would not have succeeded.

Figure 3 (62 - 100)

By starting the ko with 62, White obtained consecutive moves on the left side at 66 and 70, but at the cost of provoking Black 69, which



Dia. 1

7 connects




Figure 3 (62 - 100)


removed any chance of an attack on Black's top left group. After 69, if White plays 95 and Black connects at 94, Black is in a position to come out at 'a'.

If Black had played 65 at 'b' he would have had a ladder, but then White could have made a ladder block in the bottom left corner. That would give Black a clear loss.

White 74 may have been the proper move, but it could also be called slack. Since Black was alive above, it only defended.

White 80 and 82, however, were more serious mistakes. These were the two moves that definitely lost the game.

Had I been White, I would have peeped at 1 in Dia. 2, making Black connect at 2, approached the corner at 3 next, then drawn back at 5. If this sequence is too thin for White, he can simply play 1 and 5,



Dia. 2

let Black close the corner at 3, then perhaps attack the bottom right corner with 'c' in the figure.

By exchanging 82 for 83, White deprived himself of the chance to peep at 'd' later.

Black 91 and 93 essentially finished the game.




Figure 4 (101 - 195)
54: connects at 51

Figure 4 (101 - 195)

The difficulty White experienced in making territory in the center in this figure simply proved that his strategy on the left side had been wrong. It was a shame for White to lose like this, after starting so well in the top right.

White resigns after Black 195.

(Commentaries on Games One and Two translated from 'Kido', July 1981, by James Davies.)

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Takemiya Masaki

16th, 17th June, 1981. Played in Kagoshima.

Figure 1 (1 - 55)

The moves to 21 were played very quickly. That is not surprising, for they were exactly the same as the fuseki in the Meijin league match between Otake and Takemiya (black). Cho must have liked Otake's move at 20 ('a' is more common). The first change came with 22 - Otake had invaded at 'b'.

Black 25. If at 1 in Dia. 1, the sequence to 11 is probable. Black does not like White 10, because his fuseki strategy so far has emphasised the right side.

Black 29 is Takemiya-style. Black 37 and 39 continue in the same cosmic style. The exchange from 40 to 44 starts the first fight of the game.

White 42. Cho: 'I should have cut at 1 in Dia.






Figure 1 (1 - 55)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

2.'


Takemiya: 'Black would play 2 to 10 and would be satisfied.'

Cho: 'After 10, White would peep at 'a', then invade at 'b'. The game would then be decided by the fate of the invader.'


Dia. 2 illustrates the style of Cho Meijin: his fondness for territory and his ability at shinogi (saving a group in trouble).

To go back a move, Black could have followed Dia. 3 with 41. The sequence to 7 there would keep his moyo intact, at least for the time being.

Black 53—White 54. Black 53 reinforces Black's position, but White takes substance with



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

54. Takemiya: 'Black 1 in Dia. 4 is bigger than 53. Playing this way would give Black an easier game. Black 'a' (or White 'b') in the corner now becomes a small move.'

Cho: 'If White cuts across with 2 in Dia. 4 —'

Takemiya: 'Black should be able to settle his group with 3 etc. I must have been feeling a little optimistic about my position when I played 53.'

Black 55. Despite Takemiya's second thoughts about 53, 55 is a good attacking move.





Figure 2 (56 - 100)

Figure 2 (56 - 100)

Black 59. Another good move — Black cannot let White link up.

Black 73. A very slack move. Takemiya: 'Black 1 in Dia. 5 is the only move. If White 2, Black can counter with 3. Black could then look forward to



Dia. 5

attacking the centre white group.'

Cho: 'White would play something like 10, but he would be in trouble after 11.'

White 76. The sealed move.

When White lives with the sequence to 84, the position becomes unfavourable for Black. Apparently Takemiya hallucinated that White would play 80 at 82, letting him continue with Black 80 White 84, Black 'a'.


Takemiya: 'Black 85 was also funny. It should have been at 1 in Dia. 6.'

Cho: 'White would naturally cut at 2; if then Black 3, White blocks at 4.'


Takemiya: 'Anyway the continuation to 17 would be better than what was played in the game.'

White 88 is a very troublesome move for Black. Takemiya staked the game on his counterattack at 89.


White 94 is a clever move. Black can live in the corner with 1 and 3 in Dia. 7. If White 4, he



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 9

gets two eyes up to 11. (If White 8 at 11, Black exchanges 9 for White 10, then moves out at 'a'.)

Dia. 8. Note that Black dies if he changes the order of moves and plays 3 first.

After the game Cho commented that he would have played 2 in *Dia. 9* instead of 4 in *Dia. 7*. This is more efficient than 'a', as it sets up the hane at 'b'. Black could next live in the corner with 'c', but Black 3 is bigger. White would probably be satisfied with the continuation to 8, but following this diagram would be better than switching to 95 in the figure. Once White plays 100, eliminating the aji in the corner, the game seems lost for Black.

Takemiya: 'Letting White crawl at 100 was terrible. I should at least have blocked at 100, forcing White 'b', before playing 95.'




Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Black 1. If Black 'a', White pulls back at 'b', and Black cannot live.




Figure 4 (151 – 233)

92: retakes; 101: at 84; 102: connects (at 91); Black wins and connects the ko.

Essentially this game was decided by the 100th move. The subsequent play did not affect the outcome. Once again Takemiya had played well at the start of the game, but had been unable to keep it up. With three straight losses, his prospects of keeping his title seemed to be very dim.

White wins by 3½ points.

(August 'Kido' and 'Igo Club')

Game Four

White: Takemiya


Black: Cho Chikun

23rd, 24th June. Played at Wakura Spa in Ishikawa prefecture.


Commentary by Takemiya Masaki

Figure 1 (1 – 32)

Black 11. The keima at 1 in *Dia. 1* has lost popularity recently, the reason being that White makes good shape with 10.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2







Figure 1 (1 - 32)




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6


Black 13, 15. A natural counterattack. Black does sometimes crawl with 1 etc. in Dia. 2, but the result there is a little painful for him.

White 16. White only plays 1 in Dia. 3 when there is no ▲ stone. With that stone in place, White gets a cramped position.


Black 17. Cho was presumably dissatisfied with the joseki in Dia. 4. Being forced down onto the second line is perhaps painful for Black.

Black 19. Black 1 in Dia. 5, which lets White capture with 2 and 4, is bad. Black plays aggressively with 19 and 21. This pattern is comparatively rare, though it has been played before.

Black 25 is the first problem point of the fusesiki. The existing joseki is shown in Dia. 6. Black



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

4: connects

takes sente with 1 and 3. White seems to get a lot of territory, but Black does have the aji shown in Dia. 7.

Dia. 7. If White 'a' after 3, Black plays 'b'. He is captured, but he can squeeze on the outside. Instead of 'a' —


Dia. 8. White can also squeeze with 1 and 3, giving the result to 7. Black can again squeeze on the outside.

Takemiya: 'I would have found it more disagreeable if Black had not played the sagari at 25. Looking at the result to 27, I felt that this was a success for White. White 10 is better located where it is, rather than at 'a', which would be too close to Black's solid wall.'


White 28. It is very difficult to choose between this kakari and White 1 in Dia. 9. Black would make a pincer at 2, then pull back at 4, but the sequence to 9 is reasonable for White. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 10. If the hane at 4, White would play 5 and 7. Instead of 5 —


Dia. 11. The White 4-6 combination would also be possible, though it would start a complicated fight.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10




Dia. 11

White 28 and 30 seem to be simplest. The virtue of this two-space extension is that it makes the solid sagari at 25 look a little foolish.

Black 31. The only move.

White 32. A difficult point. White could play 1 and 3 in Dia. 12 (next page); if Black then crawled at 'a', well and good, but he would counter with 4 and 6, which would be troublesome.



Dia. 12


Dia. 13

Dia. 13. If White 7 and 9, Black plays 10 to 16. This is bad for White, as he cannot get a ladder with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'.


For the above reason White presses at 32, though it gives Black territory. White can afford to do this because he has taken profit in the top right corner.

After the game Takemiya thought of an interesting alternative for 32.

Dia. 14. White switches to 1 and 3, abandoning his stone in the bottom left corner. If Black 4, White plays on the left side with 5. This is a somewhat surprising strategy, but in retrospect Takemiya felt that it was best.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Dia. 16

Dia. 17

Figure 2 (33 – 101)

Black 45. If at 92, White will force with 'a'. White 52. White's aim is to force with 1 to 5




Figure 2 (33 – 101)

in Dia. 15, then to press at 7. White could also play at 'a', but building thickness with 7 would be preferable.

Black 53, forestalling the sequence in Dia. 15, looks natural, but actually it is bad style, as demonstrated soon enough. Instead of 53, Black should have extended solidly at 59.

White 58 shows why 53 was wrong: Black is forced to add an additional reinforcement at 59. Instead of 59 –

Dia. 16. Black 1, provoking White 2, is bad.


Dia. 17. The reason is that White threatens to attack with 1 to 11.

Black 61. If at 66, White intends to play White 61, Black 'b', White 87.


White 62. Takemiya also considered emphasising territory with 1 in Dia. 18. Black might invade with 2 and 4, but White could accept that.

Dia. 19. More troublesome would be the 2–4 combination. Takemiya couldn't find a suitable continuation after 4, so he decided to keep on attacking with 62.


White 64 is slack. White should first peep at 'c', forcing Black 'd', then play 64. Black would then have to move out slowly with 'e', whereas he




Dia. 18




Dia. 19




Dia. 20




Dia. 21




Dia. 22



Dia. 23



Dia. 24



Dia. 25

gains a tempo with 65.

White 68 is the honte (proper move). White 100 would leave a weakness at 68.

Black 69. A necessary invasion: if White took all the top, Black would fall behind in territory.

Black 71. Black could also peep at 1 in Dia. 20. If White 2, Black could move out lightly with 3. If White hanes at 'a', then after Black 'b', White 'c', Black gets a ladder with 'd'.

Dia. 21. White might answer at 2. The moves to 6 would follow.

Black 81. Fighting the ko at 'a' after 1 to 4 in Dia. 22 would be bad, as White would have plenty of ko threats on the left side.


White 82. If at 1 in Dia. 23, Black plays 2 and 4 and threatens to cut with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', so —

Dia. 24. White would defend at 5. Black 6 makes miai of 7 and 10, so Black lives.

White 84. If at 1 in Dia. 25, White would lose his own eyes after Black 2.


Black 89. A superb move which Takemiya overlooked. He had thought he could easily catch the black group, but Cho's analysis was more profound.

Dia. 26. If White persists in trying to capture




Dia. 26

13: connects



Dia. 27



Dia. 28

the group, he has to play at 1, but Black plays 2 to 6 in sente. The continuation is forced, leading to Black's cut at 20, which makes miai of 'a' and 'b'. White is now in more trouble than Black. Cho probably read out this variation when White played 82.

White 90 is a bad move. Takemiya spent eighty minutes on 90, but, as often happens, thinking too long on one move had a bad result. White 90 hopes for Black 1 in Dia. 27. White will force with 2 and 4, then play 6. If Black 'a', then White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', and Black cannot cut at 'e', so Black's group is in danger. Black therefore has to play 1 at 'f'.

Instead of 90, White should have captured at 1 in Dia. 28. Black can live with 2 to 16, but he ends in gote, so White can switch to 'a' or 'b'. That would give him the lead.

White 98 is a brave move. White would collapse if extending at 100 were possible for Black. Dia. 29 (next page) shows White's refutation. White 2 is a tesuji which sets up a favourable semeai for White.





Figure 3 (102 – 160)

Black is able to live with the sequence to 19. If one compares this to the result in Dia. 28 on page 57, one sees that White only has about six points in the corner, whereas in the diagram he had about fifteen (assuming White 'a'). Moreover, Black has the threat of the cut at 'a' in the figure. The point of this is that if he did make the cut, White would have to sacrifice the two stones above 'a' in order to save his group, but in that case Black would then threaten to put the corner into ko with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. All in all, it is clear that White has lost points by not following Dia. 28. At this stage the game is very close.

Black 25 is the losing move. Black should play at either 1 or 'a' in Dia. 30. Black 25 is not the kind of move one plays when one has a weak group in the vicinity.

Black 27. If at 1 in Dia. 31, White would build thickness with 2 to 8. Either 'a' or 'b' next would give White a favourable result.

Black 29. If at 1 in Dia. 32, White plays 2 to 10. Black gains nothing from this result.





Figure 3 (102 – 160)



Black 35. Black does not have the threats to fight the ko in Dia. 33. However, White 36 makes victory certain for White. Cho's ill-judged invasion at 25 (played under time pressure) turned a close game into a lost cause.

Black 47. If at 'e', White 51 is big.

Black 53 and 55 prepare to make a second eye here in case White pulls out 30.

White 60. If Black 'f', White will counter with 'g', Black 'h', White 'i'.

Figure 4 (161 – 228)

White 88. The post-game dialogue –

Cho: 'Why didn't you kill me and get it over with?'

Takemiya: 'I realised the moment I played 88. My apologies.'

The game would have been over immediately if White had played 1 and 3 in Dia. 34.

If Black kept on playing after 128, the sequence Black 'a' to White 'h' is likely. That would put White about two points ahead on the board.

Black resigns after White 228.




Figure 4 (161 – 228)
70: below 61; 107: at 105



Takemiya must have been relieved to win the fourth game and avoid a shutout.

Book Review

Five-In-A-Row (Renju) by Goro Sakata 8-dan and Wararu Ikawa 5-dan. 153 pages. Published by Ishi Press. 1,100 yen.

Properly speaking, the title of this latest Ishi Press book should be *Renju* only, for, as the authors point out, renju is not quite the same as five-in-a-row or, as the Japanese call it, gomoku narabe. The object — that of making an unbroken line of five stones along a horizontal, vertical, or diagonal on a fifteen by fifteen board — is the same, but whereas five-in-a-row seems to be played by whatever rules the two players agree on, renju has an established set of rules that has been worked out and codified by the Japanese Renju Association. Apparently this is a recent development, and the present-day rules have been in effect for only about twenty years. At the heart of the renju rules are certain restrictions on Black to offset his advantage at having first move. Yet it is these very restrictions which give renju much of its strategic focus and tension and perhaps raise the game to a higher level. Thus, much of the play turns on whether White can force Black into making a prohibited move.

In the first chapter of *Five-In-A-Row (Renju)* the authors give background information, explain the rules with the aid of numerous diagrams, and provide examples from actual games. Although the authors claim that the rules are few (there are

only five) and simple, the rule governing prohibited moves sometimes creates situations that are not obvious to the beginner. The authors deal with these as they occur in the text; nevertheless, the reader should be cautioned to think about these positions carefully.

The second chapter treats exhaustively two renju josekis and gives two complete games with commentaries. The two josekis were chosen to illustrate why renju has placed restrictions on Black: Black wins every time without them. The josekis are hard work and are best regarded as material for more advanced players (for example, some moves are left for the reader to work out on his own), but if the beginner is patient enough to work through the large number of variations, he should come away with a better grasp of the game.

The final chapter is mainly a problem section which is divided into three groups of ten problems in increasing order of difficulty. Also included are two puzzles, or problems for amusement.

The serious go payer is likely to dismiss renju out of hand, but this may be an injustice to renju. On the other hand, a book in English on renju should be welcomed by those go players who enjoy a little variety or by those whose go has stuck in gear, but for whom the feel of the stones is still a necessity.

— David W. Thayer

Page from Go History

Genjo and Chitoku

The first great player of the nineteenth century was O-Senchi, the 7th Yasui head (see GW23), but the two players who really built up the foundation of the golden age of go were his successor, Nakano Chitoku (1776 – 1838), and the 11th Honinbo, Genjo (1775 – 1832).

Genjo and Chitoku are two of the most celebrated rivals in go history. A number of factors made their rivalry unique: they were almost the same age, their strength was perfectly matched even though they had very different styles, and their lifetime results were very even, with neither player gaining an ascendancy. Even more unusual for two such great rivals, who were after all the heads of two go schools which had at times been bitterly opposed to each other, they were close friends. They were promoted simultaneously to 7-dan (in 1804) and 8-dan (in 1814), but from deference to the other, neither sought to become Meijin godokoro. Both believed that the rank of Meijin was something which Heaven would naturally grant to an outstanding player and that it would be wrong actively to seek it for oneself. As we have seen in the history of Edo go, such a lofty philosophy was rather exceptional. Later generations of go players have agreed that they reached the level of 9-dan, and it is generally accepted that if they had been born in different ages, they would both have become Meijin. They are numbered among the Four Sages (Shitetsu), that is, the four players who were of Meijin class but who, by historical accident, did not become Meijin (the other two are Gennan Inseki and Honinbo Shuwa).

Genjo was born in Edo in 1775, his family name being Miyashige (he is said to have been born in a samurai family). He became the heir to Retsugen in 1798 and became the 11th Honinbo in 1809 (Retsugen died in December 1808). In 1819 he appointed Jowa as his heir and he retired in 1827, dying five years later.

Nakano Chitoku was born on the island of Mishima in Izu in 1776, and his father is said to have been a fisherman. In 1800, when he was 5-dan, he was chosen as the heir to O-Senchi. When he became the 8th Yasui, in 1814, he took the name of Yasui Senchi, but he is better known simply as Chitoku. He died in 1838 while still

head of the Yasui school. He is considered the greatest Yasui player.

Chitoku did not inherit the spectacular, centre-oriented style of his teacher, O-Senchi. His go is territory-oriented and his forte was shinogi (saving groups in trouble). Genjo, in contrast, played an attacking style of go, favouring high positions and thickness. The two played their first game with each other in 1788 and their lifetime record was as follows (from Genjo's point of view).

Genjo – 42 games on white: 6 wins, 32 losses, 2 jigo, 2 unfinished

– 35 games on black: 27 wins, 6 losses, 2 jigo (total: 33–38–4)

Chitoku won five more games than Genjo, but then he played seven more on black, so it seems reasonable to conclude that the two were perfectly even in strength. In this and coming issues we shall look at a number of their masterpieces.

Genjo v. Chitoku (1788)

This is the first encounter between these two players. At this time they were probably about 2-dan.

White: Miyashige Genjo (age thirteen)

Black: Nakano Chitoku (age twelve)

Date: 3rd October, 1788. Played at the residence of Lord Inaba of Tango. 193 moves. White resigns. *Commentary by Shimamura Toshihiro 9-dan, with reference to a brief commentary by Segoe Kensaku 9-dan.*

Figure 1 (1 – 47)

White 6 is irregular – it should be a kakari at 20 or 'a'.

Black 17. Black 'b' would also be good.

White 32 prevents Black from extending to 35. However, Segoe comments that White 'c' is the key strategic point.

White 34 is too aggressive. Answering peacefully at 1 in Dia. 1 would be good enough. The continuation to 9 would give a reasonable game.

White 38. If at 39, Black counters with Black 38, White 42, Black 'd', and White has no good continuation.

White 40. Genjo was probably dissatisfied with being forced down onto the second line, but he had no choice. If White cuts with 1 in Dia. 2, he loses six stones.




Figure 1 (1 - 47)






Figure 2 (48 - 100)


ko: 51, 54; ko (at 60): 79, 82




Dia. 1




Dia. 2




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Figure 2 (48 - 100)

White 56. Permitting Black to seal him in with 57 is bad: White must poke his head out at 'a'. Black would take the ko, but White would have to block at 56 and fight the ko. Once Black plays 57, White cannot get a good result even if he wins the ko. His aggressive play in Figure 1 has backfired.

Black 59. If at 60, White would have to defend the corner at 'b', but Black's centre position would be a little thin. The aim of 59 is to attack the corner later with the combination in Dia. 3.

Black 67. This attack is overdoing things — defending the corner with 'c' is better. Black 67 just sets up good moves for White at 68 and 74.

Black 75. Segoe: 'I would prefer 'd'.'

Black 83. Segoe: 'This contact play establishes Black's lead.'

White 84. If at 1 in Dia. 4, Black would counter with 2 and 4. This result is not interesting for White. Instead of 1 —

Dia. 5. If at 1, Black 2 is still a good answer. This result is no better.

White 94 shows poor fighting spirit; losing is preferable to playing a move like this. White should defend at 1 in Dia. 6 and aim at playing White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' later. If White did play 1, Black would probably give atari at 'b'.

White 96 indicates that Genjo must have been feeling a little desperate. It looks unreasonable, but White has to create complications to have a chance. Segoe comments that White should have played 96 at 99.







Figure 3 (101 - 140)



Dia. 7 5: connects



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Figure 3 (101 - 140)

Black 13. A crucial move — if Black played at 15 immediately, White would be able to stage an upset.

Dia. 7. If Black 1, White plays 2 to 6 and wins the semeai by one move.

Black 25. A careless move. If Black had followed *Dia. 8*, White would probably have resigned. After 26 to 34 in the figure, White 36 becomes sente, so White is able to invade at 38.

Figure 4 (141 - 193)

White 42 is a little thin. Connecting at 1 in *Dia. 9* would be more solid. If 2, White could




Figure 4 (141 - 193)

link up with 3; if then Black 4, White could squeeze with 5 to 9. Black would capture two stones, but White could make it a false eye and still aim at attacking the whole group. Capturing it would be rather a distant prospect, but still...

Black skilfully uses the cut at 43 to get shinogi for his group. White is not given a chance.

This was an interesting game. It gives us some glimpses of the great players these two were to become, while at the same time there are still many immature elements in their game.

White resigns after Black 193.

Genjo v. Chitoku (1793)

White: Nakano Chitoku

Black: Miyashige Genjo

Date: 8th March, 1793. Played at the Honinbo residence. 208 moves. Black wins by 5 points.

Commentary by Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 16. Better to jump to 36. The result to 25 is not very good for White.

Black 31 is an obstinate move. White has refrained from enclosing the corner, so Black could of course enter at 32, but he gets more satisfaction from forcing White to play 32.

Black 43. A superb boshi.

Black 49. A leisurely move which waits to see which way White jumps. However, capping at Black 50 seems preferable; if White pushed at 49, Black could answer with 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)




Figure 2 (51 - 75)

Figure 2 (51 - 75)


Black 51, 53. This ponnuki does not have very much effect on White when he has already reinforced with 50 in Figure 1. Up to 58 White recovers to some degree from his poor start.

Black 59. A very severe move, better than the conventional keima at 'a'. If White answers at 61, Black takes up a nice attacking stance by playing at 60. White finds it advisable to defend in the centre at 60, though that permits Black an excellent osae at 61. Genjo has scored some points here.

White 72, 74. A brilliant parry. If White played 72 at 'b', Black would continue his attack with 'c'.

Black 75. If Black 1 in Dia. 1, White will

counter with 2 to 10, getting more territory in the centre than Black does on the side. Black therefore switches to 75, keeping the threat of 1 in the diagram in reserve.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2





Figure 3 (76 - 150)



Dia. 3

Figure 3 (76 - 150)

Black 83 is a tesuji. If White plays 'a', Black will exchange 88 for White 'b', then make the hane at 91. White nips that scheme in the bud with 84. The continuation to 100 is forced.

Black 103 is a clever peep. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 2, Black will force with 2 to 6, then play 8. That would be enough to win.

Black 107 and White 108 are miai.

White 130. White cannot connect at 1 in Dia. 3 because of Black 2 to 10.




Figure 4 (151 - 208)
The game record stops at 208.

Figure 4 (151 - 208)

White 56. A sacrifice to keep sente.

White played well in the middle game, but his slow start seems to have handicapped him throughout.

Black wins by 5 points.

Genjo v. Chitoku (1790)

White: Nakano Chitoku

Black: Miyashige Genjo

Date: 19th, 27th September, 1790. Moves after 199 not recorded. Result jigo.

Commentary by Shimamura Toshihiro 9-dan

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 29, 31. A tesuji for moving out quickly. The whole sequence from 26 to 36 is inevitable. It may look as if White could extend at 35 with 34, but Black has an interesting counter.

Dia. 1. If White 1, a long and complicated semeai follows, but Black wins it. Instead of 25 -

Dia. 2. White 1 here does not work.

Figure 2 (51 - 80)

Black 55. Black is aiming at a double attack. White gets very good shape on the right with 56 to 60, so Black switches to an attack on the centre group with 61 and 63.

White 74 looks like an insouciant move, but White has prepared a tesuji at the top to look after his group. Black accepts the challenge with 77 and 79, only to be set back on his heels by






Figure 1 (1 - 50)
36: connects



Dia. 1



Dia. 2





Figure 2 (51 - 80)

White 80. This move is not a misprint.

The conventional idea for 80 would be to play the ko with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3. This is a ko which places almost no burden on Black. Instead of 2 -

Dia. 4. Black 2 here is no good, as White forces with 3 to 7, exploiting Black's shortage of liberties.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4




Figure 3 (81 - 145)

88: ko (below 85); 90: ko (right of 83);
93: ko (below 84); 94: connects (at 85)

Figure 3 (81 - 145)

When White takes the ko with 90, Black's eight stones are put into atari, so he has to capture at 91. This is the crucial difference from Dia. 3 and is the result of White's tesuji with 80. Genjo must have overlooked that move.


White 98. Capturing at 1 in Dia. 5 would be usual, but White dislikes the prospect of letting Black build central thickness with 2 and 4.

Black 99. If at 103, White will play 101, threatening to push through at 100 or to capture a stone with White 'a'. Both sides are refusing to play the obvious move, and their stubbornness leads to a dazzling exchange up to 122.


White 102 is severe. The simplest approach is White 1 and 3 in Dia. 6.

Black 111. Black does not have time to capture the two stones on the side. If he plays 1 in Dia. 7, White plays 2 and 4, setting up the tesuji of 6. An exchange results, but Black is dissatisfied, as his centre moyo is destroyed.


The exchange to 122 is forced. The result seems equal.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Black 131 is a good point, but White settles his group up to 136. This is just a little unsatisfactory for Black, so perhaps he could have tried something different with 131. For example –

Dia. 8. Black could attack with 1. If White defends the corner, Black takes considerable profit with 3 and 5. Instead of 2 –

Dia. 9. White might counter with 2 and 4. The exchange to 9 follows. This affects the centre, so Black is not so happy. All the same, the placid move of 131 in the figure is too slow, so trying something more positive is preferable.

Black 145. Since the game is close, Black would prefer to connect at 1 in Dia. 10, as that gains two points compared to the diagonal connection. However, that would give him extremely bad aji. White can play 1 to 9, and if he gets enough liberties, he has the threat of starting a semeai with White 'a'.



Dia. 10

Continued on page 47



GP1: Harunobu Courtesan



GP2: Yoshitoshi Severed Head

Important Announcement to All Go-Players, Clubs and Collectors

Power Publications has just published the first two of an important series of full-colour poster-size reproductions of classic woodblock prints, paintings, and other works of art which feature the drama and beauty of go in the history, legend and daily life of China and Japan.

Each poster will measure a minimum of 35 cm x 51 cm and will be carefully printed on heavy paper with margins, suitable for framing. Each will be fully identified, dated and described with background information contributing to the viewer's appreciation and pleasure.

Prints and paintings like these, if they could be found at all, would now cost hundreds or thousands of dollars. However, by special arrangement with the owners of several outstanding private collections, Power Publications is able for the first time to make these precious works of art available to the public in a form which captures the fascinating beauty of the original and at a price which everyone can afford.

Now available: GP1 Harunobu: Young Courtesan at the Go Board (35cm x 51cm)

GP2 Yoshitoshi: Severed Head on the Go Board (51cm x 65cm)

Price: ¥2,200/\$10 each (for orders of 2 or more, a discount of ¥220/\$1 per poster).

Posters will be wrapped in tissue wrapping paper and mailed in a special cardboard tube. For Airmail postage, add ¥220/\$1 per poster.

Payment may be made by personal cheque in US dollars drawn on a US bank, international money order or cash. Payment may also be made to the following accounts of Power Publications.

Bank of America, Tokyo Branch

Account number: 15745-015

Post Giro

Account number: Tokyo 4-73703

Note. Discounts are available for bulk orders (10 or more) and very substantial discounts for orders of 50, 100 or more.

Address orders to: Power Publications, CPO Box 1106, Tokyo, Japan